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A  VISA  TO  “SNITCH”:  AN  ADDENDUM
TO  COX  AND  POSNER
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown*
Cox and Posner’s landmark contribution is the first article to have highlighted the
challenges of information asymmetry in immigration screening.  While Cox and Posner
have undoubtedly made a significant contribution, there is a critical oversight in their
framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of screen-
ing educational elites.  This Article is an attempt to remedy Cox and Posner’s omission.
Why is this oversight so problematic?  In the post-9/11 world, U.S. immigration policy
currently finds itself on the horns of a dilemma.  While immigrant educational elites
are critical to U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting
among well-trained elites.
In visa application processes, screening out terrorism suspects is notoriously com-
plicated, in part because terrorist networks are typically difficult for outsiders to pene-
trate.  Yet, the same cannot be said of elite networks.  Indeed, the term “global elite” is
meant to reflect precisely the fact that a network of rich, well-educated persons from
developing countries exists, and that members of this network are now bona fide mem-
bers of the Western elite.  Social network theory tells us that these elites are typically only
a few degrees of separation apart.  Yet while a primary goal of immigration law is
screening, the United States currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening
elite aliens utilizing what this Article terms “insufficiently networked” information.
 2012 Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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This screening typically occurs with little reference to the closely-knit elite networks
whence these aliens originate, even as these networks are far better placed to access
information about their members.  A primary goal of immigration law should be to
leverage these networks to supply the government with early warning signals when U.S.
visa recipients display terrorist sympathies.
This Article seeks to mitigate the challenges of information gathering about such
elites through an under-utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa revocation.
If not as a de jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have access to
U.S. immigration privileges that are not easily available to their fellow nationals.
Visas are status conveyers, and their loss may undermine business and educational
opportunities dear to global elites.  In a proposal referred to in shorthand as “a visa to
snitch,” I impose a “duty to snitch” on elite visa recipients.  Each time that a visa
holder commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which persons in her
network knew of her terrorist sympathies and failed to report them.  These persons would
face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless
they were able to demonstrate that they had good reason not to know or not to report.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal scholarship has much to say about questions of immi-
grant “type,” namely, which immigrants, among the millions who seek
entry, should be admitted to the United States and in what numbers.
Yet, while much has been written about these “first-order” questions,1
the law review literature has little to say about how the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)2 can ensure that the persons selected actu-
ally match its “type” preferences.  The scholarship has been neglectful
of “second-order” questions of institutional design.3
A refreshing exception to this general scholarly inattention is Cox
and Posner’s The Second Order Structure of Immigration Law.4  They
argue that the principal institutional design choice for any state is
between ex ante screening, in which an alien is screened on the basis
of pre-entry information and denied entry if she does not fit the
state’s first-order goals and an ex post system, in which an alien is
screened on the basis of post-entry information and deported if she
does not meet first-order policy.5  Cox and Posner’s analysis is enor-
mously important: it provides a compelling explanatory framework for
many puzzles in immigration law and policy, including the astronomi-
cal increase in federal immigration prosecutions.6  They argue that
this prosecutorial trend reflects an increasing institutional bias for ex
post as opposed to ex ante screening.7
Why this ex post bias?  A primary reason offered by Cox and Pos-
ner is information asymmetry.8  Even as Congress dictates particular
1 The phrase “first-order,” as applied to immigrant “type” scholarship, is Cox
and Posner’s. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigra-
tion Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007).  For a response, see Hiroshi Motomura,
Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857–58 (2007).
2 In the aftermath of September 11, the federal government was reorganized to
create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  DHS now houses Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which bears primary responsibility for the federal
immigration enforcement function.  For a discussion of how DHS was organized to
accommodate ICE, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 12–24 (5th ed. 2009).
3 This scholarly neglect is also briefly discussed in a previous contribution by the
author. See generally Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compli-
ance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (2009).
4 Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. R
5 See id.
6 See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. R
7 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. R
8 For a general summary of the challenges of information asymmetry, particu-
larly in the context of contracting, see PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT,
CONTRACT THEORY 31–34 (2005).  For a broader discussion of ex ante versus ex post
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type preferences, the government is generally not well placed to col-
lect and screen information about potential migrants.  For example, a
potential migrant will generally know much more about herself, and
whether she will abide by U.S. immigration laws, than a consular visa
officer.9  Post-entry screening mitigates the challenges of information
asymmetry since the United States is better able to access and screen
information about aliens once they are already in the country.10
Herein lies the primary explanation for the post-entry bias: given min-
imal access to reliable pre-entry information, DHS expends significant
resources “double-checking” that only the right “types” have been
admitted to the United States and ferreting out and deporting the
“wrong” types, particularly among low-skilled aliens who are often
unable to provide reliable pre-entry documentation.11
Post 9/11, there is evidence that the United States has also
invested significant resources in ferreting out and deporting the
“wrong types” even among members of the global elite,12 namely, the
group of persons who occupy the apex of their social order, attend
the same coterie of Western universities, and work and reside within
one degree of separation of their fellow elites in their countries of
origin.13  DHS appears to have been particularly focused on post-entry
approaches to regulation, partly because of information asymmetry, see STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 277–81 (1987).  Cox and Posner’s
primary focus is on the mechanisms of screening immigrants (that is, persons who are
admitted for long-term residence and possibly citizenship).  For broader reflections
on the applications of economic principles to immigration law including the admis-
sion of short-term guests, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Immigration Policy, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). See
also Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 271 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy
of Emigration and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234 (2006).
9 Consular officers are State Department employees stationed in embassies over-
seas.  They are typically the “on the ground” screeners of visa applications.  For a
general discussion of their role, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2. R
10 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. R
11 Id.
12 The new emphasis on federal screening of elites is discussed in Philip Shenon,
Your Children Could be Terrorists, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2010, 5:47 AM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-21/faisal-shahzad-case-spurs-feds-
to-warn-pakistans-leaders-check-your-families-for-terrorism-ties/. See also infra notes
63–67 and accompanying text. R
13 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY (1996) (using a classic sociological
utilization of the term “elite”).  See also JANINE R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE (2009), for a
contemporary utilization of the term, which is generally used to refer to a small group
of people who control a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege, and access to
decision making.  A recent issue of The Economist also discusses the extraordinary
influence of these elites, with a particular focus on elites in the developing world. See
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screening of elites with scientific credentials such as engineers.14  The
information asymmetry rationale has less explanatory power with
respect to elite migrants, since issues of information collection and
verification are less acute.15  In contrast to their low skilled counter-
parts, elites are well placed to provide tangible proxies that they will
be productive and well behaved (such as professional certifications).
Moreover, given modern advances in information technology, these
proxies may be easily verified even halfway across the globe.
Even as they are generally agnostic on U.S. institutional design
choices, Cox and Posner emphasize the reduced explanatory power of
the information asymmetry rationale in this context and appear troub-
led by the disproportionate focus on post-entry screening among edu-
cational elites.16  What is the source of their discomfort?  For elites in
particular, the economic stakes of institutional design choices appear
to be high.  Why so?  There is a real risk that highly talented but risk-
averse persons may be deterred from migrating to the United States.
The economic data is unambiguous: the U.S. economy needs educa-
tional elites.17  Microsoft Founder Bill Gates has famously pointed out
that Google, Oracle, and Intel were all founded by immigrant com-
puter scientists.18  Notably, the Blackberry smart phone was also
The Rich and The Rest: What to Do (and Not Do) About Inequality, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22,
2011, at 13. In social science circles, the term “elite” has long been associated with
Marx scholars. See generally TOM BOTTOMORE, E´LITES AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1993)
(describing Marx’s theory of social classes).  However, the term has long had broader
currency shorn of Marxist connotations, and there have been several landmark stud-
ies of economic, political, academic, and cultural elites, primarily in the “West,” but
also more broadly. See generally G. WILLIAM DORNHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967);
FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE (1953); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER
ELITE (1956); MICHAEL SCHWARTZ, THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN AMERICA (1987); ROB-
ERT D. PUTNAM, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES (1976) (all containing
detailed anthropological, sociological, or political science studies of how elites
function).
14 Cox and Posner use the term “highly skilled.”  I will utilize this term inter-
changeably with “educational elites.”
15 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 825. R
16 Id.  Motomura also seems to share a similar concern. See Motomura, supra
note 1, at 869 (noting that “lessons in Second-Order Structure about ex post screening R
are less convincing for noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States, and espe-
cially unconvincing for permanent residents”).
17 See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. R
18 Bill Gates’s testimony is summarized in Miriam Jordan, Skilled Worker Visa Appli-
cants Expected to Soar, WALL ST. J., Mar., 31 2008, at A2. See also Competitiveness and
Innovation on the Committee’s 50th Anniversary with Bill Gates, Chairman of Microsoft: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 110th Cong. 138 (2008) (statement of William
H. Gates, Chairman, Microsoft), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/
exec/billg/speeches/2008/congress.mspx; Stuart Anderson, 40 Percent of Fortune 500
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invented by immigrants—in Canada rather than the United States.19
Gates contends that the United States is falling behind in the competi-
tive race for global talent due partly to an anachronistic immigration
system.20  Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns and are
disinclined to augment these challenges.21  Thus, in the context of the
highly skilled, they seem to express a preference for ex ante
screening.22
Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant contribu-
tion; they are the only scholars to have weighed the comparative
advantages of ex ante versus ex post approaches.  Yet, there is a critical
oversight in their framework: they do not discuss the importance of
targeted ex post mechanisms of screening the highly skilled.  Why is
this problematic? While elite immigrants are clearly critical for U.S.
economic growth, terrorist networks have also stepped up their
recruiting among such elites.  Among the many aspirants to global
notoriety as bombers, it is the elite and well educated that are most
likely to be chosen by Al Qaeda’s leadership.23  Indeed, Al Qaeda’s
own leadership has been populated by such elites.24  Among recent
terror attempts, the most highly publicized was that of the Pakistani
would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who was previously a
recipient of elite student and professional visas and was undoubtedly a
member of the global elite.25  Profiles of famous terrorism suspects
Companies Founded by Immigrants or Their Children, FORBES (June 19, 2011, 11:04 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2011/06/19/40-percent-of-fortune-
500-companies-founded-by-immigrants-or-their-children/.
19 The invention of the Blackberry smart phone in Canada is discussed in
THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 249 (2007).
20 See supra note 18. R
21 I should point out that Cox and Posner do not specifically mention Gates’s
testimony.  However, they clearly share a similar concern. See Cox & Posner, supra
note 1, at 813. R
22 Id.
23 See Richard Bernstein, Upper Crust is Often Drawn to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31iht-letter.html.
24 See id. Several members of Al Qaeda’s current leadership originate from such
backgrounds.  Most famously, Osama Bin Laden was the son of a monied and influen-
tial Saudi contractor.  His former deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, is a doctor from an afflu-
ent and prominent Egyptian family with several distinguished academics. See id.
25 At the time of the attack, Shahzad was a naturalized American citizen.  How-
ever, prior to naturalization he had been the recipient of several visas, including an F1
student visa to study at an American university and a highly selective H1B visa for
skilled foreign nationals.  Times Topics, Faisal Shahzad, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.ny
times.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/faisal_shahzad/index.html?scp=1&
sq=Shahzad%20&st=cse (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). While Shahzad had recently
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reveal this theme repeating itself.26  Moreover there is another critical
omission in Cox and Posner’s analysis: ex ante screening is compli-
cated because elites have resources which allow them to obscure “red
flags.”  Additionally, some persons undergo extreme radicalization
only after they receive their visas.  For such subjects, ex ante screening
would hardly suffice; ex post screening is critical.
Indeed, this was one of the justifications offered for the FBI’s
large-scale questioning of students and scientists of Middle Eastern
origin after 9/11.  Although the FBI’s dragnet has generally withstood
judicial review,27 such action is arguably ineffective.  There needs to
be a narrow and targeted mechanism of double checking that elite
aliens meet U.S. type preferences.  This Article offers one such mecha-
nism.  Congress should leverage highly desirable visas to elicit valuable
information about potential terrorists.  To accomplish this goal, it
should impose an explicit requirement on certain U.S. visa holders to
inform on family and friends who may harbor fanatically dangerous
hatred of America—or risk losing their highly coveted access to the
United States.  I will refer to this proposal in shorthand as “a visa to
snitch.”
Notably, several of Shahzad’s family and friends, including his
father—a retired high ranking Pakistani military officer—noticed his
extreme radicalism.28  And yet no one among Pakistani elites—pre-
fallen on hard times, by virtue of his advantages of birth and Western education, he
was undoubtedly a member of the global elite.
26 See Bernstein, supra note 23.  Andrew Sullivan makes a similar point in his R
Atlantic Monthly blog. See Andrew Sullivan, A Very Bourgeois Would-Be Bomber, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY: DAILY DISH (Dec. 26, 2009, 10:53 AM), www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/
archive/2009/12/a-very-bourgeois-would-be-bomber/192537/.
27 A summary of the outcome of legal challenges to the FBI’s post-9/11 dragnet
of student visa recipients of Middle Eastern origin and Muslims more generally is
included in MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA’S
CHALLENGE 7–14 (2003). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES:
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNEC-
TION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003) (summarizing
government response to the 9/11 attacks); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN
DETENTION CENTER IN NEW YORK (2003) (describing allegations of abuse in New York
in response to post-9/11 investigations).
28 The question of what precisely constitutes Islamic fundamentalism is a contro-
versial one.  In “Western” public political discourse, the phrase has come to be used
interchangeably with Islamicism and generally refers to the group of religious ideolo-
gies advocating a return to the “fundamentals” of Islam as embodied in the Quran
(the holy book) and the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet Muhammed). See gen-
erally GRAHAM E. FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (2003) (examining political
Islam, its evolution, and its role in the future); OLIVIER ROY, THE FAILURE OF POLITI-
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sumably with U.S. visas and ready access to both Pakistani and U.S. law
enforcement—appears to have snitched.29  Consider the contrasting
behavior of the father of the “Underwear Bomber,”30 Umar Farouk
Abdul Mutallab (“Abdulmutallab”),31 a prosperous Nigerian engineer-
ing student and a repeated recipient of multi-entry, multi-year U.S.
visitors’ visas.32  As a well-known banker and philanthropist, Father
Mutallab was undoubtedly a member of the global elite and was also a
recipient of a multi-year, multi-entry U.S. visitors’ visa (henceforth
“Mutallab”).33  He repeatedly alerted the American authorities to his
son’s trips to Yemen, an atypical destination for a member of Nigeria’s
CAL ISLAM (1994) (claiming that the Islamic revolution, state and economy are
myths). Central tenets include the obligation of Muslims to obey sharia (Islamic law);
pan-Islamic political unity; and the removal of non-Muslim (particularly Western)
political, cultural, and military influences from the Muslim world.  Yet others indicate
that Islamicism has been erroneously conflated with fundamentalism.  They argue
that it consists of a continuum of more fluid ideologies that emphasize Muslim iden-
tity, authenticity, the unity of Muslim peoples, and the general revitalization of Mus-
lim community. See generally FRED HALLIDAY, ISLAM & THE MYTH OF CONFRONTATION
(1996) (analyzing the contemporary Middle East in a variety of ways); VOICES OF
RESURGENT ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed., 1983) (examining the Islamic resurgence).
29 Since then there have been media reports that several other well-heeled Pakis-
tanis—including some with U.S. visas—are well known among Pakistani elites to har-
bor terrorist sympathies.  Yet, this information is not being shared with U.S.
intelligence. See Shenon, supra note 12. R
30 The bomb-making materials were concealed in Abdulmutallab’s underwear,
which accounts for the would-be bomber’s popular name.  Anahad O’Connor & Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Says Plane Passenger Tried to Detonate Device: Popping Sound on a Trans-
Atlantic Flight Was First Thought to be Fireworks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1; Kath-
leen Gray & Christina Hall, Attempted Attack Raises Airport Security Concerns, DET. FREE
PRESS (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.freep.com/print/article/20091226/NEWS05/
91226035/Attempted-attack-raises-airport-security-concerns; James Sturcke, Flight Ter-
ror Suspect Abdulmutallab Charged With Trying to Blow Up Jet, GUARDIAN UK (Dec. 27,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/27/us-terror-flight-abdulmutal-
lab-charged.
31 In particular, at the time of the attempted terrorist attack, he had a multiple-
entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa (also known as the B-2 visa).  Duncan Gardham et al.,
Detroit Terror Attack: Profile of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Dec. 28,
2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6896128/
Detroit-terror-attack-profile-of-Umar-Farouk-Abdul-Mutallab.html (referring to trips
to both the United States and the European Union and implying that he received
several visas from these jurisdictions to travel).
32 See Adam Nossiter, Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Nigerian Terror Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at A1.
33 Id.
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jet-setting elite.34  This was a rare red flag.35  Parents generally do not
turn in their children.36
Notably, Umarmutallab, was the only one to report his son37—
though as appears to be the case with Shahzad, a much broader circle
noticed young Mutallab’s disturbing radicalism.38  In one sense, this is
unremarkable; many societies have a metaphorical equivalent of the
biblical Judas Iscariot narrative,39 signifying a deep aversion towards
“snitches.”40  But against this prevailing wisdom—and despite the per-
ceived damage snitching could do to his son, his family, his commu-
nity, and his country—the interests of the elder Mutallab and the
34 This point has been made by several commentators including D.B. Grady at
the Atlantic Monthly, in his blog. See D.B. Grady, Why Heads Should Roll, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Jan. 8, 2010, 10:05 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2010/01/why-heads-should-roll/33175/.
35 Maureen Dowd, the New York Times op-ed writer was one such commentator.
See Maureen Dowd, Captain Obvious Learns the Limits of Cool, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010,
at WK11.  The prominent blogger, D.B. Grady, cites several opinion leaders expres-
sing this view. See Grady, supra note 34. R
36 Dowd makes precisely this point. See Dowd, supra note 35.  Dan Markel, Jen- R
nifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib also discuss the difficulties inherent in the decision
of whether to inform on a family member. See Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1155–56.
37 See Dowd, supra note 35. R
38 See id.  Indeed, media reports were filled with stories from Nigerians of similar
social station who knew Abdulmutallab and his family, discussing signs of his increas-
ing radicalism, while simultaneously expressing shock that one of their own could
have engaged in a terrorist attack.  Mary M. Chapman, “Shocked” Nigerians in U.S.
Express Fears of Guilt by Association After Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/12/30/us/30detroit.html?_r=1.
39 Judas Iscariot famously “snitched” on Jesus. Matthew 26:14–15.  Natapoff notes
the universality of the Judas narrative.  Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional
and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 651 (2004).
40 This antipathy appears to be particularly strong towards cooperation with the
U.S. government, given the deep ambivalence among many Muslim elites about U.S.
foreign policy.  Given the controversy attending U.S. policy towards “the Muslim
world,” recent polling data has captured a deep distrust among Muslim populations
towards U.S. foreign policy.  Although notably President Obama appears to be more
popular in the Muslim world than President Bush, this distrust persisted even after
President Obama assumed office in virtually all Muslim countries. See PEW GLOBAL
ATTITUDES PROJECT, MOST MUSLIM PUBLICS NOT SO EASILY MOVED (2009), available at
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (tracking attitudes toward
the United States in Muslim countries).  In this respect, Nigeria appears to be an
outlier.  Although approximately half of the population is Muslim, a majority of
Nigerians expressed positive views of the United States even during the Bush adminis-
tration, whose policies were often controversial.  Since the advent of the Obama
administration, a poll in 2009 revealed that nearly seventy-nine percent of Nigerians
expressed positive attitudes towards the United States. See id. at 1.
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United States converged.  Father Mutallab, a paradigmatic member of
the Nigerian Muslim elite, assumed the classic role of “snitch” and
turned in his son.  Hence the subject of this Article: How do we create
incentives for elites to snitch on one another?  By articulating a duty
to snitch, the United States would essentially be codifying the behav-
ior of the elder Mutallab.
What do I mean by a duty to snitch?  This proposal is not con-
cerned with criminal sanctions.41  Rather, it is concerned with another
under-utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa revocation.
Elites value their U.S. market access and the revocation of such access
is a serious sanction.  Under this proposal, each time that a visa holder
commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which per-
sons in her network knew of her tendencies and failed to report them.
These persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a
reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demon-
strate that they had good reason not to know or not to report.
This Article is deliberately provocative.  Even in the absence of
criminal sanctions, the imposition of a duty to “snitch” rightly causes
discomfort.  It has a bad odor about it, recalling an earlier Cold War
era when aliens had their visas revoked for suspected Communist
associations (as demonstrated by their refusal to snitch on suspected
American communist associates) and raising uncomfortable First
Amendment questions.42  For this reason, even with technical fixes,
the proposal may not only be unimplementable but also undesirable.
It bears emphasis: the point of this Article is not to offer a feasible
proposal, but instead to throw a metaphorical bomb and to raise
uncomfortable “what if” questions.43  In so doing, I hope to provoke
the sort of response that might typically be elicited by a thought
experiment and to cause readers to think more deeply about the
power of association to expose valuable information.
Part I includes a more detailed discussion of Cox and Posner.  In
Part II, I focus on my primary subject, Abdulmutallab, assembling a
rough reconstruction of what his visa file might have looked like.  Why
41 The United States could hardly impose criminal sanctions on a foreigner over-
seas for a failure to snitch.  Indeed, given longstanding criminal law principles, it is
doubtful the United States could impose such criminal sanctions on U.S. citizens in
U.S. territory, absent affirmative collaboration in planning a terrorist attack.
42 This history is summarized in John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas:
The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1496
(1988).  First Amendment challenges are likely to fail. See infra note 230. R
43 For this reason, it is not within the scope of this Article to address many other
practical issues that might arise in the administration of this proposal, including ques-
tions of standards of proof and so forth.
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Abdulmutallab?  Through background interviews with national secur-
ity experts, I learned that Abdulmutallab is an ideal subject to explore
the challenges of ex post screening since he was radicalized after his
visa was approved.  Moreover, it appears that the United States’ infor-
mation concerning Abdulmutallab was what this Article will term
“insufficiently networked.”  In the future, this deficiency may be reme-
died through the simple threat of strategic revocation of the visas of
elites, who may be the peers of would-be terrorists.  Notably, the
United States is already strategic in visa revocation when pressing for-
eign policy goals are at stake, as evidenced by its revocation of the visas
of Honduran elites in the aftermath of a Honduran coup.44  Addition-
ally, this section also lays out two critical portions of the “duty to
snitch,” namely the information-screening and sanctioning compo-
nents, drawing on the literature on collective sanctioning, and more
broadly on network theory.
In Part III, I shift from the primary subject, Abdulmutallab to the
“snitch,” namely, the elder Mutallab.  Although motives are notori-
ously difficult to ascertain, it is important to consider the elder Mutal-
lab’s potential motives—precisely because we hope to create
incentives for similar behavior in others.  I include an analysis of his
potential decision-making matrix incorporating insights from the
Nigerian blogosphere and other sources.  In a departure from most
accounts, I suggest nontraditional motives.  A somewhat cynical game
theory-inspired view would note that the elder Mutallab is a quintes-
sential “repeat game” player with the United States.  As a banker, he is
necessarily dependent on U.S. market access to conduct his business;
snitching may be viewed as a pre-emptive mechanism of protecting his
financial interests.  Yet another view of Mutallab’s motives is nobler.
Nigerian society famously puts great stock on honor as a value.  Shame
has been a prominent motif in the communal retelling of
Abdulmutallab’s narrative.  Snitching may be conceived as a pre-emp-
tive mechanism of mitigating an anticipated blow to familial, tribal,
and national honor.
Notably, in this particular instance, communal norms appear to
have already been working in the United States’ favor.  The United
States may strategically deploy this prioritization of family honor as a
mechanism for motivating persons to share important information.
How does this insight apply in practice?  Prominent Islamic American
groups have highlighted prosecutorial overkill, such as dragnets of
44 See Official: U.S. Revokes Visas of Honduran President, 15 Others, CNN (Sept. 12,
2009, 8:35 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/12/honduras.
visas.revoked/.
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Muslim student visa recipients conducted after 9/11.45  The key is to
keep the community on the side of the authorities.  If terrorism is
viewed as antithetical to family honor, soft sanctions such as a threat
of visa revocation may be more effective than heavy-handed
approaches.
In Part IV, I discuss the metaphorical elephants in the room.
Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement,
Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative
duties (i.e., to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply
not to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society.  Although
Malcolm X was speaking specifically in reference to African American
Muslims, his point was much broader, namely, that such actions may
alienate precisely those portions of the population whose support the
law enforcement authorities need.46  There is also a concern regard-
ing the McCarthyite penumbra associated with a duty to snitch.  More-
over, the United States will need to guard against corruption of the
process more generally, particularly given the dangers of elite capture.
For example, elites may deliberately share inaccurate information to
discredit competitors.  Finally, I address the implications of all of the
foregoing insights for U.S. immigration law and policy.
I. SETTING UP THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM
A. Historical Context for Institutional Design Choices: Why Ex Post
Screening Has Been Neglected
Congress has charged the executive branch with screening for a
dizzyingly large spectrum of alien “types,” from highly skilled com-
45 This point has been made by several members of the umbrella advocacy group,
the American Muslim Political Coordination Council, including the Muslim Public
Affairs Council, the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim Council and
the Council on American Islamic Relations.  The Council on American Islamic rela-
tions, the largest Muslim lobby group has been particularly vocal in this regard. See
COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2002), available at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRight-
sReports/2002Report.aspx; see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS 35 (2007),
available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf; Omar Sacir-
bey, Muslims Look to Blacks for Civil Rights Guidance, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE (May 15,
2006), http://www.religionnews.com/index.php?/rnspremiumtext/muslims_look_to
_blacks_for_civil_rights_guidance/ (documenting the concerns of Muslim lobby
groups regarding prosecutorial heavy-handedness).
46 See generally BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (George Breitman ed., 1970) (providing
a variety of works by Malcom X); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X
(with the assistance of Alex Haley) (1992); MANNING MARABLE, ON MALCOLM X
(1992).
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puter scientists,47 to wealthy investors,48 to aliens of “extraordinary
ability,”49 to low-skilled guest workers.50  Screening millions of appli-
cants for a wide range of specific types should typically require institu-
tions that are finely tuned to such goals.  However, a primary source of
what one scholar has termed immigration “dysfunction” is that institu-
tions are poorly designed for a primary function—namely, screen-
ing.51  Cox and Posner’s exploration of the comparative advantages of
ex ante versus ex post screening in institutional design has the poten-
tial to alleviate such dysfunction.52
This is not an obscure academic issue.  The importance of Cox
and Posner’s work can hardly be overstated: their institutional design
focus has enormous consequence for real-life questions of how immi-
gration law has historically been enforced.53  Indeed, it is precisely
because their work is so important that their failure to appreciate the
importance of ex post screening in the context of the highly skilled is
so troubling.
But in at least one sense, this oversight is also unsurprising.  The
federal government only began to restrict immigration in the late
19th century and even then, there were no provisions making immi-
grants deportable for post entry conduct.54  These provisions were
only introduced in 1917 and significantly expanded over the last cen-
tury.55  However, as a matter of practice, ex post screening was
focused on the poor and low-skilled, as opposed to elites.56
47 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (containing H(1)(B) provisions for the
admission of the highly skilled).
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2006) (providing for visas to be issued to immi-
grants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that generates full-
time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful residents; these are generally known
as “E” Treaty Investor Visas).
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A)–(B) (providing for visas to be issued to immi-
grants of “extraordinary ability” or who are “outstanding” with a significant likelihood
of making innovative contributions to the American economy); § 1153(b)(2) (provid-
ing for visas to be issued to immigrants with advanced academic training or who pos-
sess “exceptional ability”).
50 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (containing guest worker provisions).
51 An excellent discussion of how what he terms systemic “dysfunction” in the
immigration system is augmented by the challenges of screening is contained in Mari-
ano-Florentino Cue´llar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law 23–28 (March
7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
52 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. R
53 A good summary of the implications of institutional design for “real life” deci-
sion making is contained in Cue´llar, supra note 51, at 29–38. R
54 See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1996).
55 See id. at 22–23.
56 See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 433–35 (2006).
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To support this point, some broad historical context is in order.
Zolberg’s landmark historical study of migration contends that prior
to the development of modern transportation, typically, very few per-
sons left their countries of origin.57  Even these migrants customarily
had some pre-existing connection to the country of migration.  More-
over, migrants generally met relatively little resistance at the port of
entry.58  Zolberg notes that great “powers” such as France and Great
Britain liberally admitted migrants from their broader colonial
empires.59  The overall thrust of his historical analysis is clear: gener-
ally, the numbers of migrants were small, and admission policies were
liberal.  There was little need for a complicated system to determine
which migrants merited admission.  This was particularly true in the
United States, which has been singularly welcoming to migrants.60
All this changed in the twentieth century.  The World Bank has
argued that a defining feature of the twentieth century was that peo-
ple started to move at previously unparalleled levels.61  With unprece-
57 Id. at 7.
58 Id. at 78–79.  It bears emphasis that post-entry, migrants often found signifi-
cant hostility in adjusting to their new homes. Id. at 298.
59 Even other empires that proved more resistant to long-term migration, such as
the Germans, liberally admitted short-term migrants according to their economic dic-
tates.  The Germans typically denied migrants long-term membership.  For a discus-
sion of the historical German approach to migrants, see PATRICK WEIL, ALL OR
NOTHING? WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM EUROPE AS IT CONTEMPLATES
CIRCULAR MIGRATION AND LEGALIZATION FOR UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 7, 12
(Immigration Paper Series, 2010), available at http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?
ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F921ADCBE5588F8A52DA2349D55444994E
E21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA95658FE9FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32
B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D276334C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04.
60 ZOLBERG, supra note 56, at 57.  Professor Neuman’s historical analysis of Ameri- R
can immigration law suggests a different interpretation than Zolberg’s of the develop-
ment of the rules governing U.S. immigration.  His work discusses the development of
complicated immigration rules at the state level early in the U.S. Republic. See Gerald
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833, 1841–57 (1993).
61 The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report that worldwide labor
mobility trends will lead migration to remain at the center of contentious political
debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS at vii (2006),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2005/11/14/000112742_20051114174928/Rendered/PDF/343200GEP02
006.pdf.  In the last three decades, the population of migrants in high income coun-
tries has doubled, registering an annual growth rate of three percent. See id. at 26–27.
Migrants now constitute nearly three percent of the population worldwide, and eight
percent of the population of industrialized countries. See id. See generally LANT
PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME 2 (2006) (“[T]he United States is in the throes of
a deep and contentious debate about immigration policy.”).
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dented levels of migration came domestic political resistance to new
migrants in diverse countries.  Social and economic pressures (from
the Great Depression to nativist political parties and so forth)
culminated in a similar outcome in different states62: more stringent
rules across the board in an effort to stem the flow of new migrants.63
Yet even so, prior to the relatively recent development of the
modern state, it was difficult for the state to locate, exclude, and
deport undesirable migrants.64  As a practical matter of limited state
capacity, overwhelmingly, states focused on ex ante screening.65  The
United States was no different.  If deportation was hardly a realistic
policy option for a young country with a still poorly developed state, it
was much better to determine whether a migrant was inadmissible ex
ante.66
In the early twentieth century, this changed.  Why the new focus
on ex post screening?  Among many possible factors, a structural
change in the nature of migration appears to be the primary factor.
For most of U.S. history, migrants were overwhelmingly documented
entrants who came through seaports.  The nature of migration
changed with increasing numbers of undocumented migrants from
Mexico and Central America crossing at land borders, which were
much more difficult to police than sea ports.67  In the face of this type
of migration, an exclusive focus on ex ante exclusion became
anachronistic.68
Ex post screening offered an alternative strategy.  However, even
after ex post screening measures developed, there was minimal ex
post screening of the highly skilled until relatively recently, with a sig-
nificant spike in ex post screening after 9/11.69
62 See WORLD BANK, supra note 61, at 26–27. R
63 See id.
64 See ZOLBERG, supra note 56, at 69–70. R
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 The landmark work in this regard has been conducted by Douglas Massey at
the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, who has analyzed Mexican
migratory patterns over the last century. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND
SMOKE AND MIRRORS (2002) (discussing the series of legislative and bureaucratic
changes that fundamentally altered the rules under which the Mexico-U.S. migration
system operated); Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproductive
Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (discuss-
ing inconsistencies in immigration reform since 1986).
68 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. R
69 This point is well made in a report by the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies. See generally CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, SECURITY CON-
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B. Ex Post Screening as the Dominant Strategy
Ex post screening is no longer just an alternative strategy.  It is
now arguably the primary mechanism of immigration enforcement.
The evidence is significant: immigration authorities currently expend
more resources on ex post screening than on ex ante screening.70
Consider, for example, the burgeoning federal law enforcement focus
on “crimmigration,” that is, the prosecution and deportation of aliens
who commit crime.  Immigration cases now constitute the majority of all
federal criminal prosecutions.71  Additionally, the increased emphasis
on post-entry screening is reflected in the fact that immigration law
often treats post-entry criminal behavior (in the United States) much
more harshly than equivalent pre-entry behavior criminal behavior (in
a migrant’s country of origin).72  Indeed, a conviction that is not a
ground for excluding a first-time arriving alien may well constitute
grounds for deportation of a long-time permanent resident.73
Cox and Posner’s singular contribution is to offer a “macro”
bird’s eye view that provides critical context for this trend.  In their
view, a primary reason for this institutional bias for post-entry as
opposed to pre-entry screening is information asymmetry.  An alien
must typically commit in her visa application to abide by the rules
governing the visa in the event that she is eventually approved.74  A
potential migrant will generally know more about herself and whether
TROLS ON THE ACCESS OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TO THE UNITED STATES
(2005), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051005_whitepaper.pdf.
70 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 839–40. R
71 Cox and Posner do not utilize the word “crimmigration,” which has gained
greater currency since the publication of their article.  However, they clearly refer-
ence the increasing utilization of federal enforcement resources to identify and
deport aliens who have committed relatively minor crimes. See Cox & Posner, supra
note 1, at 813.  For an excellent summary of the data concerning the significant R
increase in federal immigration prosecutions, see David Allen Sklansky, Crime, Immi-
gration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  This issue
is also discussed in the following articles: Jennifer M. Chaco´n, Managing Migration
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, The
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 469, 480 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigra-
tion Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367
(2006).  For a recent addition to this literature, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immi-
gration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010).
72 See Legomsky, supra note 71, at 480. R
73 See id.
74 See, e.g., Nonimmigrant Visa Application, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://evisaforms.
state.gov/ds156.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 17 20-APR-12 11:00
2012] a  visa  to “snitch” 989
she will abide by the rules than a consular officer.75  The dispropor-
tionate focus on post-entry screening reflects the fact that the United
States is often better able to access reliable information about aliens
once they are in the country.76
Questions of information asymmetry are most acute with respect
to low-skilled aliens.77  The typical low-skilled migrant lacks the tradi-
tional documentary mechanisms of credibly establishing that she is
likely to be a law-abiding, productive contributor.78  She is less likely
than the typical high-skilled applicant to provide traditional and tangi-
ble evidence of traits that are proxies for desirable “type” (such as
graduation certificates).79  Moreover, the typical low-skilled migrant
comes from a developing country with poorly-resourced and some-
times corrupt public institutions.80  Thus, individual-level constraints
are augmented by nationwide resource and governance constraints,
which undermine a potential migrant’s efforts to provide evidence
(such as credible police reports)81 from the authorities of her inclina-
tion to play by the rules.  Thus, the resource challenges of the devel-
oping world augment the challenges of information collection.  In
summary, ex post screening mitigates these challenges.
C. Cox and Posner’s Oversight
Cox and Posner’s analysis is generally positive as opposed to nor-
mative.82  That is, they are generally concerned with illuminating
which factors lead to immigration screening choices, as opposed to
criticizing these choices.  Thus, they are generally agnostic as to
whether a state should typically pursue ex ante or ex post screening.83
However, they come closest to critiquing the disproportionate focus
on ex post screening when it comes to migrants with elite credentials.
The information asymmetry rationale is less compelling for skilled
migrants.84
75 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.  I also discuss this issue in detail in a R
previous contribution. See Brown, supra note 3, at 2488. R
76 See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. R
77 See Brown, supra note 3, at 2488. R
78 See id. at 2499.
79 See id.
80 The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this popu-
lation that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, supra note 61, at 57–58. R
81 See id.
82 Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815. R
83 Id.
84 Id. at 847.
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In contrast to their low-skilled counterparts, the educational elite
are well placed to provide tangible proxies that they have been law-
abiding, productive community members in their country of origin,
such as university diplomas, professional affiliations, and evidence of
business ownership.85  Indeed, this is precisely why other jurisdictions
such as Canada and Australia have been able to develop “points” sys-
tems, which reward highly skilled migrants with expedited visa
access.86  Not only are highly skilled migrants able to provide docu-
mentary evidence of their academic, professional, and business cre-
dentials, but in the modern age of information technology, the DHS,
working with the State Department, can easily verify an elite appli-
cant’s credentials, even thousands of miles away in India or China.87
Consequently, the United States, like its other developed-country
counterparts has access to highly detailed, fine-grained information
about the highly skilled, irrespective of where they live.88  Accordingly,
the United States has less justification for its ex post focus.
There is another reason that Cox and Posner are disturbed by the
disproportionate ex post focus.  Historically, U.S. migration has
involved an implicit long-term contract, which has been termed
“immigration as contract.”89  If persons are well behaved, they are gen-
erally viewed as “Americans in waiting” and are eligible for long-term
membership through naturalization.90  An emphasis on ex post
screening (with the corresponding “sanction” of deportation)91
85 Id. at 835.
86 See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive
Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 171–79 (2006).
87 See id. at 169 n.74.
88 See id.
89 The phrase “immigration as contract” has been heavily utilized by Motomura.
See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING (2006); see also Adam B. Cox &
Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1403, 1407 (2009) (applying a similar metaphor of a “contract” between the state and
the migrant); Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 818. R
90 The term “Americans in waiting,” which gained currency in recent immigrants’
rights protests is originally Motomura’s. See MOTOMURA, supra note 89. R
91 One might question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be con-
strued as a sanction.  If an alien does not abide by the terms of her visa, and the host
country deports her, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual obligation
that the alien agreed to (as a condition of her visa) in the first place?  Indeed, there is
a longstanding debate in the immigration law literature as to whether deportation
should in fact be viewed as a punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that an “order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime”); cf. Legomsky, supra note 71, at 514 (arguing that theories of deportation R
overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment that deportation should at
least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment).
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implies that the United States may later revoke this implicit contract.
Herein lies the dilemma: risk-averse, but talented high-skilled persons
who are ideal migrants may decline to migrate to the United States.
More bluntly put, why should a computer programmer invest in
migration to (and assimilation into) the United States, when she may
later be found to be an inappropriate “type” and subject to deporta-
tion?  Why not go instead to Canada?
There is significant evidence that skilled migrants contribute dis-
proportionately to U.S. economic growth.92  Additionally, their chil-
dren are also likely to be highly productive.  For example, New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman discusses the children of skilled
immigrants who dominate the United States Physics team and Intel
Science competitions, and ultimately go on to work and form high
tech companies.93  While a broad array of lobby groups agree that suc-
cessful global recruitment of the highly skilled is essential to long-term
U.S. economic growth, an institutional framework not well suited to
such recruitment continues to undermine efforts to recruit highly
skilled immigrants.94
Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns; they are con-
scious of and disinclined to contribute further to this poor institu-
tional framework.95  Thus, they express a preference for ex ante
screening in the context of the highly skilled.96  In their words, “the
main advantage of the ex ante system is that it reduces the risk faced
92 A brief summary of this literature is included in Shachar, supra note 86, at R
149–50.  For a good introduction to the global competition for skilled persons see
MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION at xi–xxxi (2008). See also B. LINDSAY LOWELL
ET AL., INST. FOR THE STUDY OF INT’L MIGRATION, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, FOREIGN
STUDENTS COMING TO AMERICA (2007); VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., DUKE UNIVERSITY,
SCHOOL OF INFORMATION, U.C. BERKELEY, AMERICA’S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS 5
(2007); Gnanaraj Chellaraj et al., The Contribution of International Graduate Students to
U.S. Innovation, 16 REV. INT’L ECON. 444, 458–59 (2008); William Kerr, Ethnic Scientific
Communities and International Technology Diffusion, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 518, 536
(2008); William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa
Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 474, 504–05 (2010); AnnaLee Sax-
enian, Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant High-Growth Entrepreneurs, 16 ECON. DEV. Q. 20,
29–30 (2002); Paula E. Stephan & Sharon G. Levin, Exceptional Contributions to US
Science by the Foreign-Born and Foreign-Educated, 20 POPULATION RES. & POL. REV. 59,
74–76 (2001); Madeline Zavodny, The H-1B Program and its Effects on Information Tech-
nology Workers, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 1, 8–10 (2003); Sari Pekkala Kerr
& William R. Kerr, Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey (Harvard Business School,
Working Paper, No. 09-013, 2011) (on file with author).
93 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 270. R
94 This point is made by Cue´llar. See Cue´llar, supra note 51, at 10–11. R
95 Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. R
96 Id. at 835.
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by potential immigrants that they will be deported, so that risk-averse
noncitizens are more likely to enter and invest in the country than
they are under the ex post system.”97
This Article points out a critical oversight in Cox and Posner’s
framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post
mechanisms of screening the highly skilled.  Why is this problematic?
U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the horns of a
dilemma.  While the highly skilled are clearly critical to U.S. economic
growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting among the
highly skilled.  Moreover, the highly skilled are also most likely to gain
access to the United States.  They are also singularly well prepared to
execute terrorist attacks.
The bottom line: While Cox and Posner are correct in stating
that ex ante screening may be more appropriate for elites, ex post
screening is still critical.  What is needed is a targeted mechanism of
ex post screening that meets U.S. security concerns, while not under-
mining efforts to recruit the best and the brightest.  In the next sec-
tion, I consider how this goal might be accomplished through the lens
of Abdulmutallab and other highly skilled terrorist subjects.
II. ABDULMUTALLAB
A. A Note on Methodology
A word on methodology is in order.  In this section, my primary
subject is Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian “Underwear” bomber, and
elite engineering graduate who received a multiple-year, multiple-
entry visitor’s visa.  As a Nigerian national, Abdulmutallab would have
been required to submit his visa application at a U.S. consulate in
Nigeria.98  The question becomes: What was available to the U.S. con-
sulate in Nigeria on both an ex ante and ex post basis?  I consider how
the consular authorities might have “filled in the blanks.”
Typically, visa files are not available for public view.  Moreover,
for obvious reasons, subsequent law enforcement interviews with ter-
ror suspects are classified.  Thus, I am only able to create a rough re-
enaction of what a subject’s visa file might have contained.  In an
effort to find an ideal subject, I created a narrow list of potential sub-
jects, including only elites who had either carried out or attempted to
carry out a terrorist attack.  In order to further narrow down this list, I
97 Id. at 813.
98 This requirement is stipulated by the U.S. Department of State Visa Rules. See
Nonimmigrant Visas, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO NIGERIA, http://nigeria.us
embassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
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interviewed persons with national security expertise.  While
Abdulmutallab was not a long-term migrant,99 repeatedly, he was rec-
ommended by such experts as a subject choice.
This recommendation primarily arises from the fact that
Abdulmutallab was the subject of extensive reporting, by not only the
Western press, but also the Nigerian press.  It appears that Nigerian
journalists were able to access on-the-ground sources, which were
more difficult for foreign correspondents to find.  Why is this rele-
vant?  Notably, it was the Nigerian (as opposed to the U.S.) press,
which first reported that Abdulmutallab’s father had visited the U.S.
consulate repeatedly to raise concerns about his son.100  Nigerian
journalists have been essential to Western media outlets (and indeed
to this Article).  In comparison to other countries from which elite
terror suspects have originated, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
Egypt, Nigeria is more highly ranked on indices of press freedom.
This perhaps enabled more rigorous on-the-ground reporting, partic-
ularly in the subject’s tightly-knit Muslim community.101  This has typi-
cally not occurred in other terror suspects’ home countries.
Moreover my research was also aided considerably by extensive
reporting by European news outlets.  What accounts for their interest?
Although Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S.
bound flight, he could just have made a similar attempt in the Euro-
pean Union (E.U.) given his easy access to several E.U. countries.
Indeed, Abdulmutallab boarded the U.S. bound flight in the Nether-
lands.  Moreover, he had previously received multiple E.U.
(Schengen) visas, which authorized admission to many E.U. member
states.102  Abdulmutallab had also previously received a U.K. student
99 It bears emphasis: Abdulmutallab was not admitted as a long-term immigrant.
Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening immigrants (that is,
persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly citizenship).  How-
ever, they point out that their analytical framework is also applicable to the challenges
of admitting temporary guests such as Abdulmutallab.  Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at R
818.
100 See, e.g., Dora Akunyulim, Mutallab is a Stranger, NEXT, http://234next.com/
csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5503108-147/Mutallab_is_a_stranger,_Dora_Akunyili.csp
(last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (consolidating a variety of Nigerian newspaper outlets
which reported that Father Mutallab had visited the U.S. consulate repeatedly to voice
his concerns).
101 See Press Freedom Index 2009, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org/
spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001 (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  While
Nigeria is still in the bottom half, it is clearly more highly ranked than all the other
countries mentioned. See id.
102 The Netherlands is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, a treaty (signed
near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg), between five of the ten member states of
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visa.  It appears that only one state—the United Kingdom—rejected
his application for visa renewal (presumably on the basis of ex post
screening, since he had previously received a visa).  Thus, in several
different jurisdictions, journalists were seeking to determine why their
own immigration authorities had failed to successfully screen him.103
This accounts for the availability of detailed news accounts that
allowed me to assemble a rough reconstruction of information that
might have been missing from his visa file.
B. Abdulmutallab’s Visa Application
A consideration of Abdulmutallab’s network is enlightening.  He
went to one of Africa’s most exclusive private schools, the British
School of Togo, to which very few Africans gain admission, and which
even fewer can afford to attend.104  He studied there for the prestigi-
ous International Baccalaureate examination.105  While he was denied
admission to Stanford University, he did sufficiently well in his high
school examinations to attend University College London’s highly
selective engineering program.106  While there, he achieved an hon-
ors engineering degree.107  In London, he lived in a family apartment
in one of the city’s chicest districts.108  He was surrounded by relatives
and friends who were part of a tightly knit group of rich Nigerian
expatriates in London.109
the European Economic Community.  The Treaty created the Schengen Area
through the complete abolition of border controls between Schengen states, common
rules on visas, and police and judicial cooperation.  Thus, in order to gain admissions
to the Netherlands, Abdulmutallab needed a Schengen visa. See Schengen: Europe With-
out Internal Borders, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/poli-
cies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
103 Additionally, his family’s extensive ties to the United Kingdom enabled partic-
ularly detailed reporting by the British press.  In contrast to the family and friends of
other would-be bombers, Abdulmutallab’s network of family and friends appear to
have been more cooperative with the press.
104 See Gardham et al., supra note 31. R
105 Peter Walker et al., Rich and Privileged—The Gilded Life of the Would-Be Plane
Bomber, GUARDIAN UK (Dec. 27, 2009, 2:17 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/
2009/dec/27/gilded-life-of-plane-bomber.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. But see Xan Rice, Bombing Suspect Was Pious Pupil Who Shunned High Life
of the Rich, GUARDIAN UK (Dec. 31, 2009, 5:50 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/dec/31/bombing-suspect-abdulmutallab-nigeria-home (noting that his
affluence appeared to have caused him some discomfort).
109 See Gardham et al., supra note 31. R
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Abdulmutallab had a multiple-entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa,
also known as the B-2 visa.110  Although this visa category is in principle
available to any Nigerian national who is not a visa overstay or security
risk, in practice the documentary requirements are so stringent that
only a tiny minority of elite Nigerians are typically eligible.111  In the
Nigerian context, Abdulmutallab achieved what a former Ambassador
has termed an exclusive badge of honor—namely a U.S. visa.112
In the aftermath of Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing, DHS
was accused of having missed important clues while screening.113  The
110 A B-2 visa is granted to a foreigner seeking to enter the United States for tour-
ism purposes. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 214,
66 Stat. 165, 189–90 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 101, 214 (a) (1996)).
The Nigerian Information Minister noted that he “sneaked into” Nigeria, implying
that the Nigeria security forces were on alert and would have detained him if he had
stopped in Nigeria. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. R
111 While approximately sixty-six percent of Nigerian applicants for non-immi-
grant visas are approved, against a background in which most Nigerians express posi-
tive views of the United States and a desire to travel to the United States, very few
Nigerians actually apply for visas suggesting that either the airplane and visa applica-
tion fees are prohibitive or the documentation requirements are widely perceived to
be difficult.  See PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDE PROJECT, supra note 40.  The percentage of R
Nigerians with non-immigrant visas is miniscule.  For a summary of the figures, see
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADJUSTED REFUSAL RATE, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY10.pdf.
In 2010, 64,279 Nigerians received non-immigrant visas. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FY
2010 NON IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/
FY10NIVDetailTable.pdf.  This is a tiny percentage of the general population.
Approximately 0.03% of Nigerians applied for non-immigrant visas and 0.02% were
approved.  To provide some context as to what a miniscule percentage of the Niger-
ian population has non-immigrant visas, consider the similar rates for Jamaica,
another developing country.  Although Jamaica is a much smaller country with 1.7%
of Nigeria’s population, a much higher percentage of Jamaicans have non-immigrant
visas.  For example, in 2010 approximately 43,171 Jamaicans received non-immigrant
visas. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FY 2010 NON IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, supra.  Since
Jamaica only has a population of 2.7 million people, 1.6% of Jamaicans were recipi-
ents of non-immigrant visas in 2008. See David Seminara, No Coyote Needed: U.S. Visas
Still an Easy Ticket in Developing Countries, BACKGROUNDER (2008), http://www.cis.org/
articles/2008/back208.pdf.
112 This view was expressed by the Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John
Campbell: “Nigerian elites relish the opportunity to travel to the U.S. and to own
property there.” Examining the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship in a Time of Transition: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 27
(2010) (statement of Hon. John Campbell, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa
Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations).
113 See Eric Lipton et al., Review of Jet Bomb Plot Show More Missed Clues, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2010, at A1, A14; Eric Lipton & Scott Shane, More Questions on Why Suspect Was
Not Stopped, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A1, A3; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Counterterror
Chief Faces Rough Week as Hearings Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/us/politics/17leiter.html.
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United States presumably had many mechanisms of verifying
Abdulmutallab’s bona fides.  His ties to formal institutions were well
documented, his family was prominent, and he was well known at his
schools.114  He appears to have had a detailed paper trail.
The centrality of contesting claims regarding the ease of screen-
ing the young Mutallab obscures an important point—in this particu-
lar context, screening raises peculiar concerns.  Since even applicants
for temporary tourist visas are presumed under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) to have immigrant intent, the burden is on
the average applicant to prove that she is coming to the United States
temporarily and does not intend to abandon her country of origin.115
As such, the typical visa recipient must successfully demonstrate signif-
icant ties to her country of origin and financial assets to support her-
self while visiting the United States.116
As evidence of home-country ties, Abdulmutallab’s visa applica-
tion would typically have noted his extensive family in Nigeria.  As evi-
dence of his ability to support himself while in the United States, it
would undoubtedly have noted his family’s significant asset base,
including major shareholdings in several companies and valuable real
estate in the European Union and the United States.  Further evi-
dence of nonimmigrant intent would be his history of travel without
visa overstays.  Moreover, his previous studies at an elite boarding
114 See Stolberg, supra note 113. R
115 See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 165, 189
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 101, 214 (a) (1996)) (“The admission to
the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under
such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . . to insure
that at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which
he was admitted, or to maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 248,
such alien will depart from the United States. . . . (b) Every alien [other than a nonim-
migrant described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than
a nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except sub-
clause (b1) of such section] shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes
to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the
immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a
nonimmigrant status . . . .”).
116 See also Visitor Visa—Business and Pleasure, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://
travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (“The
presumption in the law is that every visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant.
Therefore, applicants for visitor visas must overcome this presumption by demonstrat-
ing that: The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S. for business, pleasure, or medi-
cal treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited period; Evidence of
funds to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of compelling social and eco-
nomic ties abroad; and That they have a residence outside the U.S. as well as other
binding ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of the visit.”).
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school and at an elite engineering program would also be relevant
since it would typically be difficult for well-educated persons to work
as undocumented aliens in the United States.
Indeed, on the basis of a typical ex ante screen, Abdulmutallab
would not have looked substantially different than any other well-edu-
cated and wealthy Nigerian.  As one interview subject pointed out,
without the benefit of hindsight bias,117 Abdulmutallab’s profile is not
substantially different than that of Adebayo Ogunlesi, another well-
educated Nigerian national who first came to the United States as a
young man.  He subsequently went on to graduate from Harvard Busi-
ness School, become an editor of the Harvard Law Review, a Supreme
Court clerk and Vice-Chairman of Credit Suisse.118  Indeed, Ogunlesi
is precisely the sort of elite that Cox and Posner are worried about
deterring.  Moreover, Abdulmutallab’s profile is not discernibly differ-
ent from many other well-educated Nigerians.  How could a visa
officer be reasonably expected to differentiate Abdulmutallab from
this pool?
Moreover, Ambdulmutallab reminds us that the profiles of elite
visa recipients may change in critical ways after they first receive their
visas.  What the consular officer could not have anticipated is
Abdulmutallab’s time at a religious training institute in Yemen run by
an American imam, whose role in training terrorists is apparently so
significant that his assassination has been authorized by President
Obama.119  A consular officer would also not have anticipated his
leadership role of a student Islamic society that was well known for
inviting radical speakers to his London university campus.120
Although elites are typically in a much better position than non-
elite visa applicants to submit detailed paper trails, screening on an ex
ante basis is complicated by the fact that their resources allow them to
obscure “red flags,” such as travel to countries on terrorist watch lists.
For example, Abdulmutallab’s passport bore no Yemeni entry stamp
117 See infra text accompanying note 170. R
118 This point was made to me in an interview with the Nigerian American journal-
ist and Daily Beast contributor, Dayo Olopade who herself wrote about Abdulmutal-
lab. See Samuel Gregory, Adebayo Ogunlesi, TIME, Dec. 2, 2002, at 56, available at http:/
/www.time.com/time/2002/globalinfluentials/gbiogunlesi.html (discussing the elite
credentials of Adebayo Ogunlesi).
119 See Nossiter, supra note 32; see also Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of R
Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2010, at A12,
available at http://nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html (dis-
cussing the influence of a Yemeni American cleric on several would-be bombers).
120 Venetia Thompson, My Classmate, The Plane Bomber, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 30,
2009, 5:51 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-30/my-
classmate-the-undie-bomber.html.
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although he traveled there repeatedly, presumably because he had
the resources to bribe Yemeni immigration officials.121  He is likely to
have omitted this information from any application for U.S. visa
renewal.  Indeed, this was also true of the would-be Times Square
bomber, Shahzad.  He was able to obscure another clear “red flag,”
namely, his repeated trips to an al Qaeda stronghold in Pakistan.122
The bottom line: These facts reinforce the critical nature of Cox
and Posner’s omission.  Aliens, like all people, are not static personali-
ties.  Both Abdulmutallab and Shahzad’s profiles changed such that
they no longer matched the U.S. visa “types;” they underwent extreme
radicalization only after they received their first U.S. visas.  Thus, they
would probably not have been excluded through ex ante screening.
Arguably it is precisely because of this challenge that in the after-
math of 9/11, the United States panicked and “overreached,” in its ex
post screening of elites.123  In addition to plentiful stories of Muslim
elites whose visa applications were delayed or denied, there emerged
myriad narratives of revocations of the visas of elites subsequent to their
acceptance of positions in the United States.124  Indeed, U.S. universi-
ties asserted that they were losing recruits, because scholars were
unwilling to subject themselves to the stigma of potential visa revoca-
tion, a problem that they also experienced during the McCarthy
era.125  Such criticism of the post 9/11 dragnet126 reinforces the point
121 See Lipton & Shane, supra note 113. R
122 See Faisal Shahzad Kept Low Profile in U.S., CBS NEWS (May, 4, 2010, 7:23 PM),
available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/04/national/main6459360.shtml.
123 For the best summary of this data, see B. LINDSAY LOWELL ET. AL., supra note 92. R
See also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, supra note 69. R
124 While there were several cases, the most prominent case was that of Tariq Ram-
adan, the Swiss-Egyptian scholar who accepted an endowed Chair at Notre Dame
prior to the revocation of his visa.  A good summary of the exclusion of several Mus-
lim elites including Ramadan is included in George Packer, Comment: Keep Out, THE
NEW YORKER 59, 59 (Oct. 16, 2006) (discussing the visa revocation of several promi-
nent Muslims including Ramadan whose visa was revoked on the basis of his $770 in
donations between 1998 and 2002 to a pro-Palestinian French charity that was added
to the federal government’s list of designated terrorist organizations in 2003, on suspi-
cion that the charity channeled money to Hamas).
125 See JANINE KEIL, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
VOICES OF HOPE, VOICES OF FRUSTRATION (2006), available at http://www12.george
town.edu/sfs/isd/ISD_Visa_Report.pdf; BRIGITTE SUTER & MICHAEL JANDL, INTERNA-
TIONAL CTR. FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEV., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON POLICIES TOWARD
FOREIGN GRADUATES (2006); Statement and Recommendations on Visa Problems Harming
America’s Scientific, Economic, and Security Interests, NATIONAL ACADEMIES 1 (May 12,
2004), available at www.aaas.org/news/releases/2004/0512vvisa.pdf; see also Robert
Sedgwick, Education Professionals Caution about Potential Fallout from Sept. 11, 15 WORLD
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that screening must be narrow and targeted.127  Mohammed Atta is
one engineer of Middle Eastern origin.  Another is Pierre Omidyar,
the Founder of eBay.  It is unclear that such dragnets distinguish
between the Attas and the Omidyars of this world.  With these sorts of
screening techniques, could the next immigrant Nobel Laureate
would end up elsewhere?
What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post screening that
meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining efforts to recruit
the best and the brightest.  The question then becomes, how could
the authorities have accessed the relevant information?  This is the
subject of the next section.
C. The Situation Then and Now
In the months following 9/11, detailed hearings laid bare the his-
torical difficulty that the United States had in penetrating terrorist
networks.128  Much was made of the failures of human intelligence.129
Most disturbing was the fact that many of the 9/11 hijackers appeared
to be operating in the clear light of day.  These young engineers were
widely recognized in their universities, their mosques, and more
broadly in their communities.  Although they were typically described
as middle-class Saudis, there was little doubt that they were educa-
tional elites.  They had graduated from elite Saudi universities with
highly technical engineering degrees.  Many people had reason to
EDUC. NEWS & REVIEWS, (Jan./Feb. 2002), available at http://www.wes.org/ewenr/02
jan/feature.htm.
126 In the aftermath of 9/11, the then competent immigration authority, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service provided information to the FBI which
allowed them to detain university students of Middle Eastern origin for additional
inspection in what was widely viewed as a “dragnet.” See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 92, R
at 20–24.
127 Indeed, one paper contends that domestic restrictions on civil rights have been
shown to reduce elite migration to the United States. See David Karemera et al., A
Gravity Model Analysis of International Migration to North America, 32 APPLIED ECON. 1745,
1752 (2000).
128 The findings of these hearings are most comprehensively captured in the
report of the 9/11 Commission popularly known as the “9/11 Report.”  For a sum-
mary report, see EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
(2004) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. A succinct review of the failures that pre-
ceded 9/11, with a particular emphasis on intelligence failures is included in a New
York Times editorial. See Editorial, Eight Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A26.
129 See Editorial, supra note 128, at A26. R
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know their tendencies towards radicalism and notably, no one had
snitched.130
Fast forward to the present.  Nearly ten years after 9/11, it is
apparent that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to move “up”
the food chain by attracting even more elite participants.131  The list
of recent high profile suicide bombers reads like a “who’s who” of
elites in their countries of origin.  Consider, for example, the follow-
ing persons.
Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, the Al-Qaeda affiliated sui-
cide bomber who killed several CIA operatives in Afghanistan, was a
highly regarded doctor who placed very well in the Jordanian national
exams.132  His wife was a Turkish author of some repute.133  Indeed,
he was sufficiently well known to Jordanian elites to have a working
relationship with the highest level of Jordanian intelligence, including
a member of the Jordanian royal family.134  His radical tendencies
were well known.135
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the beheading of Wall Street
Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, and a financial supporter of the 9/11
attacker Mohammed Atta, was from a rich Pakistani-British family.136
He studied at a prestigious British boarding school.137  Indeed, he
represented Britain in the International Athletic World Champion-
ships, achieved top grades in the Cambridge-administered high school
exams and studied at the prestigious London School of Economics.138
As with the other subjects, the signs were there.139  Again, no one
snitched.140
The key is to provide incentives for persons with better informa-
tion and access to accomplish U.S. goals.  The United States already
130 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 128. R
131 However, it appears that Abdulmutallab was a shadow of Mohammed Atta, the
central 9/11 bomber, in his effectiveness.
132 See Mystery of CIA Bomber’s Identity, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2010, 1:30 PM) available at
http://news.bbc.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8441292.stm.
133 See The Bomber’s Wife, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 6, 2010, 7:00 PM) http://www.
thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/07/the-bomber-s-wife.html.
134 See R. Jeffrey Smith et al., CIA Bomber Struck Just Before Search, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 2010, at A12.
135 See generally id. (detailing the radical past of the bomber).
136 See Alex Hannaford, The Toughest Boy in School, GUARDIAN UK (Feb. 22, 2005),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/23/alqaida.usa.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 Stephen McGinty, The English Islamic Terrorist, SCOTSMAN (July 15, 2002, 8:00
PM), http://www.scotsman.com/news/the_english_islamic_terrorist_1_612783.
140 See id.
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does this in a competent manner when critical foreign policy goals are
at stake.
As the next section contends, it’s simply a matter of motivating
the right people, namely, repeat-game players who need to visit the
United States.
D. Outsourced Diplomacy: Motivating the Right People
On June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was
exiled following an internal coup.  In the months subsequent to the
coup, the United States repeatedly expressed the view that the coup
was inconsistent with the constitutional obligations of the Honduran
government.141  The United States refused to recognize the interim
government, and encouraged the interim President Roberto
Micheletti (and presumed coup plotter) to come to the negotiating
table.142  For months, the Micheletti administration refused to negoti-
ate, and failed to respond to a series of U.S. efforts to ratchet up the
pressure, including the cancellations of the visas of government
ministers.143
Then suddenly, members of the Honduran business elite found
that their visas had been revoked.144  Even a cursory network map con-
firms that the subjects of the visa revocations were all businesspersons
with close relationships to Micheletti.145  The revocations were
targeted and strategic.  The implicit message was clear.  They should
utilize their influence to bring their government to the negotiating
table or face the prospect of having their visas revoked indefinitely.
The visa revocations appear to have stung particularly hard, caus-
ing some shame among Honduran elites.146  These Honduran busi-
141 The best summary of the events surrounding the coup is included in William
Finnegan, Letter from Honduras: “An Old-Fashioned Coup,” NEW YORKER, Nov. 30, 2009,
at 38.
142 See id. at 45.
143 See id. at 39; see also William Finnegan, Gone South, NEW YORKER (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/12/honduras-zelaya.html
(chronicling the diplomatic response of the United States).
144 Finnegan, supra note 141, at 39; see also Finnegan, supra note 143. R
145 Finnegan, supra note 141, at 38 (reporting that the Honduran government is R
reportedly heavily influenced by ten business families, all of which appeared to be
critics of Zelaya and, as such, implicit supporters of the coup).
146 See Finnegan, supra note 143 (“[T]he coup leaders were privately stunned by R
the firmness of the American reaction.  They seemed especially hurt by the revocation
of their U.S. visas.  This would not have happened if Republicans were still in power,
they seemed to feel.  After all, they had overthrown Zelaya partly in the name of anti-
Communism . . . .  Did the U.S. no longer recognize its friends?  The coup regime’s
first foreign minister called Obama, in a TV interview, ‘that little black man who
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nesspersons are quintessential “repeat game” players with the United
States.147  Their businesses export to the United States.148  They utilize
U.S.-based correspondent banks.  Their children often study in the
United States.149  Given these extensive business and familial networks
in the United States, visa revocation effectively curtailed their ability to
accomplish important personal and commercial objectives.  It could
not have been lost on them that the United States had the ability to
make their lives substantially more difficult if the Micheletti govern-
ment did not negotiate.  Again using game theoretic analogies, indi-
viduals with a high degree of dependence on the United States have
maximal incentives to comply with U.S. diplomatic objectives, since
the costs of defection are obviously high.
Indeed, the United States has utilized similar techniques to
accomplish diplomatic goals with respect to Cuba.  For example, pres-
tigious hotel chains were operating hotels on properties which were
the subject of legal proceedings following their expropriation from
Cuban Americans by the Castro regime.150  Although the hotel chains
were not parties to the legal proceedings and simply tenants on the
properties now “owned” by the Cuban government, the United States
revoked the visas of the hotels’ principals.151  The hoteliers quickly
terminated their leases, thereby depriving the Cuban administration
of needed lease revenue.152  Since these hoteliers were multinational
chains that were heavily dependent on American tourists in other
markets, they understood that their business model could have been
doesn’t know anything’—and that is a bland translation.”). But see Finnegan, supra
note 141, at 42 (in which a prominent Honduran business leader takes pains to make R
clear that his visa has not been revoked).
147 This relationship calls to mind a classic iterated prisoners’ dilemma, in which
the game is played repeatedly.  In contrast to a conventional prisoners’ dilemma, in
which defection is always more beneficial than cooperation, in an iterated prisoners’
dilemma, which is played over several games, each player has an opportunity to sanc-
tion the other player for prior noncooperative behavior.  Cooperation may arise as an
equilibrium outcome since the incentive to defect may be outweighed by the threat of
sanction.  See JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY 1–7 (2002) (providing a good summary for the
nontechnical reader).
148 See Finnegan, supra note 141, at 41 (describing the business successes of elite R
Honduran families).
149 See id. at 44 (describing how many rich Hondurans panicked in the chaotic
aftermath of the coup, and sought to send their children to the United States).
150 Jamaica SuperClubs Exits Cuba after U.S. Threats, BNET (Cuba News), July 1, 2004,
available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Jamaica’s+SuperClubs+exits+Cuba+after+
U.S.+threats.-a0118952223.
151 See id.
152 See id.
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greatly compromised if they continued to do business with Cuba.
That is, they too had minimal incentives to counter the United States.
In Honduras, the United States succeeded.  In Cuba, the United
States did not (although it did accomplish the more modest goal of
depriving the Cuban administration of needed revenue).  Honduras
came to the bargaining table quickly.  The process was undoubtedly
accelerated by the intervention of businesspersons who had better
information about their government than the United States and were
better placed to apply pressure to their President.  The United States
effectively “contracted out” their diplomatic functions.
Admittedly, there are clear differences between the Cuban and
Honduran instances of “outsourced diplomacy” and this proposal.  In
both the Cuban and Honduran cases, the target group was small.  The
threat of visa revocations pressured specific visa holders to take a spe-
cific action.  That is, there was a direct and non-nebulous connection
between the goal in question and the visa holders in question.  Addi-
tionally, even though this Article’s proposal is focused on a relatively
small group of elites who inhabit the apices of their societies, it clearly
involves a much broader target group (i.e., associates of as-yet-unidenti-
fied elites who may carry out terrorist acts).  Thus, the connection
between the target group and the desired outcome is clearly more
tenuous.
Notwithstanding these differences, the central lesson of out-
sourced diplomacy is still germane to the challenge of identifying
which elites with U.S. visas may carry out a terrorist attack.  Individuals
care what their peers think about them.  Visas not only facilitate travel,
they are status conveyers, and visa denial may undermine the status of
the person who loses her visa.153  Thus, persons can be influenced to
achieve U.S. goals by the strategic allocation and denial of visas.  This
is the subject of the next section.
E. The Screening and Sanctioning Principles
The United States currently finds itself in the absurd position of
screening elite aliens utilizing poor information.  Consular officers
may have the standard information: curriculum vitae, bank records,
153 Indeed, this view was expressed by John Campbell, Former U.S. Ambassador to
Nigeria, with respect to members of the Nigerian elite. See Examining the U.S.-Nigeria
Relationship in a Time of Transition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (testimony of Hon. John Campbell,
Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations)
(“The power of the U.S. government to revoke visitors’ visas is particularly potent
personal leverage with members of the Nigerian elites.”).
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professional affiliations, university diplomas.  However, consular
officers lack the nuanced information needed to read between the
lines.  For example, why was Abdulmutallab often missing classes at
university?  Given his strong academic performance, there would be
nothing in his paper trail to indicate that he missed classes to frequent
mosques that were known for radicalism.154  And why did he drop out
of the elite business program in Dubai?155  Did he remain in Dubai or
did he travel to Yemen?  With the benefit of a few conversations with
classmates and friends, the authorities would potentially have had
access to credible information about his unusual behavior, even after
they granted his visa.
Herein lies the paradox.  Although terrorist groups are typically
difficult for Westerners to penetrate, the same cannot be said of elite
networks.  Indeed, popular networking websites for elites such as “A
Small World” are dedicated precisely to this idea.156  Yet, the informa-
tion utilized to process visa applications is what I would term “insuffi-
ciently networked.”  It is garnered with little reference to the networks
aliens typically occupy, including networks of family, friends, high
school classmates, university peers, business associates, and tribal
members.  This is even as these network members are generally better
information collectors than the U.S. government.  After all, they are
“on the ground” with the persons in question.
There is precedent for creating incentives for associates of would-
be terrorists to share information.  Indeed, this is precisely why Con-
gress created the S visa, which provides long-term visas to those who
offer valuable intelligence information.157  But the S visa is not well
154 For a description of the dangers of extreme Islamic student societies, which
often serve as a gateway to radicalism, see Thompson, supra note 120. R
155 See Profile: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 11:57 AM),
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11545509.
156 See A SMALL WORLD, www.asmallworld.net (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (A small
world is “a private community of internationally minded people from around the
world,” typically featuring stories about elites in business, education, government, the
nongovernmental sector, and culture from all five continents).
157 One might wonder why this Article argues for a penalty rather than a positive
incentive to encourage informing.  Such a positive incentive already exists.  Thus, it is
worth distinguishing this proposal from the S visa.  This visa is awarded to persons
who provide invaluable information to the U.S. government.  The proposal in this
Article is completely different, namely, a disincentive for not snitching rather than a
reward for snitching (which is what the S visa provides). See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ,
supra note 2, at 830–31 (2009) (“INA 101(a)(15)(S) authorizes nonimmigrant visas
for certain individuals who are willing to share or have shared ‘critical reliable infor-
mation’ about either a general criminal organization (so-called S5s) or a ‘terrorist
organization’ (so-called S-6s) . . . .  Although the S-category had been a temporary
program and had expired just two days after the September 11 attacks, Congress soon
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targeted to elites and it is elite cooperation that is essential.  Given
their privileged status in their own countries and their generally easy
access to U.S. visa privileges, they are less likely than others to be
attracted by the prospect of an S visa authorizing a long-term U.S. stay.
Elites need a different kind of incentive.  The United States has to
threaten to take away something that they value.
Herein enters the power of association.  Although the idea of
social networks appears to be a modern concept, human beings have
always been social creatures; we live, work and play in groups.158  This
basic intuition underlies much of modern life.  Facebook’s extraordi-
nary success is simply a manifestation of this intuition.159  And yet,
although this seems obvious, we have failed to take account of this
intuition in how we grant and revoke visas to enhance national
security.
The “visa to snitch” proposal is based on two major arguments,
which will be succinctly referred to as the information-screening com-
ponent and the sanctioning component.  The information screening
component argues that network members who are proximate to visa
recipients may be motivated to share with officials inside information
as to which persons are likely to be terrorist threats.  The sanctioning
thereafter passed legislation to make the program permanent.  Pub. L. No. 107-45,
115 Stat. 258 (Oct. 1, 2001)).  On November 29, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft
wrote a memo launching the “Responsible Cooperators Program,” in which he offi-
cially encouraged various Justice Department personnel to make liberal use of S visas
in “appropriate cases.”  In those instances in which a person who is willing to share
important terrorism-related information is ineligible for an S visa, the Attorney Gen-
eral urged the officials to consider parole or deferred action as an incentive for coop-
eration. See 78 IR, at 1816-17 (Dec. 3, 2001)”).  There are also other visas that
incentivize “snitching” including the following: the U and T visas.  For a discussion of
the U visa, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at 412 (“The U-visas are for
those who have ‘suffered substantial physical or mental abuse’ as the result of . . .
rape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, prostitution, female
genital mutilation, involuntary servitude, abduction, felonious assault, and several
other criminal acts.  The person must possess information concerning that criminal
activity and must help law enforcement officials to investigate or prosecute. INA
§ 101(a)(15)(U).”).  For a discussion of the T visa, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra
note 2, at 412 (“T visas are for victims of a ‘severe form of trafficking in persons’ who
are physically present in the United States or a port of entry as a result of that traffick-
ing.  If age 18 or over, the person must comply with any reasonable request for assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of the trafficking.  INA § 101(a)(5)(T).”).
158 Granovetter’s landmark work popularized this concept. See generally Mark S.
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF SOC. 1360 (1973) (discussing the
importance of “linkage” to the development of sociological theory).
159 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Facebook’s Valuation: By the Numbers, WALL ST. J.
(Jan 3, 2011, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/01/03/facebooks-valua-
tion-by-the-numbers/.
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component contends that astute officials can utilize soft rules, which
leverage the ties within networks to send signals to network members
about the costs associated with not sharing information that may be
relevant to terrorist investigations.
The information-screening component contends that the United
States should motivate network members to aid in both ex ante and ex
post screening.  That is, network members should be incentivized to
share information in the initial screening process, before visas are
issued.  But as importantly, they should also be provided with incen-
tives to share such information even after visa issuance.  Thus, an elite
visa-recipient would be sanctioned essentially for failing to report evi-
dence of the transgressions of his peers even if these transgressions
occurred after the person had already received a visa.  Why is this
important?  Some of Abdulmutallab’s associates admitted that
although they found his behavior troubling, they had not raised an
alarm since they took his student visa to constitute evidence that he
had already been screened by competent authorities.  Under this pro-
posal, excuses such as these would not be acceptable.
F. What Is the Appropriate Sanction?
Of course a “duty to snitch” must necessarily be accompanied by
a sanction.  Under “a visa to snitch,” the United States would penalize
network members by revoking their visas (or at a minimum reducing
the likelihood of visa renewal), if they cannot account for their failure
to share pertinent information about a network member’s terrorist
sympathies that it appears that they had reason to know.  If not as a de
jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have access
to immigration privileges that are not normally available to their fel-
low nationals.160  In exchange for this privilege, recipients of elite visa
access should understand that there are implicit duties.
This proposal has clear resemblances to collective sanctioning sys-
tems, where community members are sanctioned for the sins of their
communal peers.  Historically collective sanctions have been
employed effectively to improve compliance in a variety of informal
arenas in which formal structures for the collection of information
were either not present or insufficient.161  Although such resem-
160 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
161 See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 (2003).
Daryl Levinson provides a brief overview of the utilization of collective sanctions both
historically and in modern times with an emphasis on functional rationales for collec-
tive sanctioning, emphasizing that the central features of modern legal systems,
including vicarious, joint and several, and corporate liability, are justified utilizing
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blances are thin as opposed to thick, this point should be conceded.
Collective sanctioning systems have generally been criticized for fail-
ing to abide by the principle that individual wrongdoers should pay
for their individual transgressions and, thus raise significant justice
concerns.
Thus, the question of the appropriateness of the penalty is deli-
cate, particularly given that the signs of terrorist sympathies are often
nebulous.  Hence, the sanctioning principle emphasizes that sanctions
should be “soft.”  In so doing, I contrast it with sanctions that are typi-
cally experienced as “hard.”  For example, the U.S. decision to subject
all Nigerian travelers to significantly increased scrutiny (following
Abdulmutallab’s bomb attempt) was understood by Nigerians as an
affront to their national dignity and arguably qualifies as a “hard”
sanction.162
It bears emphasis: signs of terrorist activity are often nebulous.
Again, the case of the younger Mutallab is instructive.  Take for exam-
ple, his leadership of a university Islamic society that has been called a
“hotbed of radicalism.”163  With the benefit of hindsight commenta-
tors argued that this was a clear warning sign.164  However, it is not
clear that this warning sign would have been evident to the average
observer.  Indeed, given historical context, the very designation of
Abdulmutallab’s membership in a student group as a “red flag” may
cause our antennas to go up.  During the McCarthy era, many stu-
dents were denied First Amendment protection as “radicals.”165  Anti-
similar functional rationales. Id.; see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Joint and Several Liability, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 371 (1998) (defining terms); Alan O. Sykes, Vicarious Liability, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 673–77 (1998) (defining term).
For a further discussion in the law review literature of the moral and functional justifi-
cations for collective sanctions, see also Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility
and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 85, 88–90
(1995).
Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive
discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning.  For example, economic
historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial revolution in late
medieval times by allowing long distance commercial exchange between parties who
had no prior knowledge of each other. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and
Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
525 (1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989).
162 See Akunyulim, supra note 100. R
163 Thompson, supra note 120. R
164 See generally id. (explaining the signs which should have tipped off others).
165 For a summary of First Amendment challenges to McCarthyism in universities
see, ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER 3–11 (1986); see also DAVID CAUTE, THE
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Vietnam student groups were investigated precisely because they were
perceived as “hotbeds of radicalism”166 by the Nixon administration.
Historians have subsequently judged such investigations to have been
motivated by paranoia.167  Thus, there is a fine line between vigilance
and paranoia.  Leadership of a controversial student group does not
necessarily signify a tendency to violence (although an Islamist society
is arguably of a different character than a Vietnam protest group).
Was his leadership of an Islamist student group relevant?168
Since several leaders of this particular student group have been
indicted on terrorism charges, it appears that the answer is yes.169
Should his friends have subsequently been accountable for failing to
alert the authorities to his leadership of this group?  There is clearly a
potential issue of hindsight bias: research on human judgment sug-
gests that the typical subject has difficulty ignoring a known outcome
when assessing an event’s likelihood.170  Moreover, there is also the
issue of what behavior we may reasonably expect the average non-
expert network member to consider suspicious.  While Abdulmutal-
lab’s leadership of an Islamist society might have appeared relevant to
an expert eye, this might not have been clear to a reasonable (but
non-expert) network member.
This is precisely why prior to visa revocation, the visa recipient
(who is suspected of not having shared pertinent information) should
clearly have an opportunity to explain herself.171  Moreover, a soft
approach in sanctioning is counseled by the fact that rather than sim-
ply imposing negative duties not to cause harm, the authorities would
be imposing affirmative duties to prevent harm.  The aim is to impose
GREAT FEAR (1978) (discussing the targeting of “radical” students and professors by
different federal and state investigations); DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE
(1983) (same).
166 Richard Nixon was famously of this view. See CHARLES STUART, NEVER TRUST A
LOCAL 138 (2005).
167 See id.
168 Gardham et al., supra note 31. R
169 See id.
170 For a good discussion of hindsight bias, see Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlin-
ski, Ex Post ? Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89
(1995) (discussing evidence of hindsight bias in diverse fora from jury to surgical
decision making).
171 I should note that most visa holders would not typically be entitled to due
process.  “[A]n unusual provision in the INA 104(a) exempts individual visa determi-
nations from the supervision and control of the Secretary of State. . . . There is no
procedure . . . that permits the applicant to appeal a visa refusal to some higher
administrative authority.“ THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP 651 (5th ed. 2003).
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a soft sanction, that is, a penalty that is sufficiently tough to deter non-
compliance, but not so tough as to undermine precisely the coopera-
tion that one is trying to encourage.
Indeed, the INA already allows the authorities discretion to deny
visas to individuals who are believed to have weak connections to ter-
rorist networks, without providing them any opportunity to disabuse
authorities of such suspicions.172  This proposal appears more reason-
able, in that persons will be given an opportunity to explain them-
selves.  The point is that there is an obvious line-drawing issue here,
but it is hardly different than the type of line-drawing issue that law
enforcement officials regularly deal with in the course of many investi-
gations.  Given the inherently imprecise nature of terrorist sympa-
thies, it will be incumbent on an official to take this into account in
determining whether an associate of a suspect should reasonably have
known or have reported her suspicions.
Notably, visa applications do not typically ask applicants to list
associates.  This is an interesting omission.  During the Cold War, U.S.
visa applicants were regularly asked to name their affiliations with
Communist persons.173  The point is not to ally this proposal with the
misguided methods of the McCarthy era, but simply to point out that
this omission in the visa application could easily be remedied.  In any
event, it is unclear that the government would necessarily want to rely
on references provided by the applicant.  Savvy applicants would sim-
ply fail to list associates who might raise alarm.  Moreover, even in the
absence of associates provided by the applicant, modern network anal-
ysis (the subject of the next section) will allow the government to gen-
erate its own network list.
172 INA § 212 declares that a person is not eligible for admission to the United
States if they “commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords
material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds,
transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identifi-
cation, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives,
or training . . . for the commission of a terrorist activity.”  8 U.S.C
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)–(aa) (2006). See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at
851, for a discussion of the controversy surrounding this provision.
173 See, e.g., Scanlan, supra note 42, at 1490 (discussing pre-emptive screening of R
visa applicants for those with Communist affiliations); see also i-192 APPLICATION FOR
ADVANCE PERMISSION TO ENTER AS A NON-IMMIGRANT, available at www.uscis.gov/files/
form/i-192instr.pdf (“Do not file this application if you are [a visa applicant who is]
inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(D) for being a member of a Communist or
other totalitarian party . . . .”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 38 20-APR-12 11:00
1010 notre dame law review [vol. 87:3
G. Why the Solution Can Work
Given recent lessons from social network theory,174 finding the
right people to shed light on potentially problematic visa applicants is
entirely practical.  Although social network theory has only recently
gained currency in the popular imagination as a consequence of the
ubiquity of social networking sites, its insights are not new, drawing as
they do from long-established precepts of sociology, anthropology,
computer science, and organizational behavior.
We can understand social network analysis as:
[M]ap[ping] and measure[ing] formal and informal relationships
to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows that
bind interacting units, viz., who knows whom, and who shares what
information and knowledge with whom by what communication
media. . . . Because these relationships are not usually readily dis-
cernible, social network analysis is somewhat akin to an “organiza-
tional x-ray.”175
Network theory coupled with modern technology provides an
easy mechanism of verifying which persons are members of a network.
Again, Abdulmutallab is a case in question.  Notably, he had 287
Facebook friends the day before his terrorist attack.176  After the inci-
dent, the number of Facebook friends appeared to be falling fast.
The point is that people care about which networks they are perceived
to be a part of.  Clearly, his Facebook friends did not want be per-
ceived as part of his network.
However, there is the problem of information overload.  Who
precisely is elite?  The elite by definition are a group of relatively small
size, occupying a position of privilege within a much larger society.
But the question remains: Which elites precisely should be targeted?
174 Olivier Serrat, Social Network Analysis, KNOWLEDGE SOLUTIONS, Feb. 28, 2009, at
28, available at http://www.cin.vfpe.br/idal/SN%20-%20PFD/Social-Network-Analy-
sis.pdf (Social networks are defined as “[n]odes of individuals, groups, organizations,
and related systems that tie in one or more types of interdependence: these include
shared values, visions and ideas; social contacts, kinship, conflict; financial exchanges,
trade, joint membership in organizations; and group participation in events, among
numerous other aspects of human relationships.”).
175 Id. at 2; see also Noel M. Tichy et al., Social Network Analysis for Organizations, 4
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 507, 510–13 (1979) (describing methods of social network
analysis).
176 See Rich Tehrani, Terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab a Social Networker,
TMCNET (Dec. 29, 2009), http://blog.tmcnet.com/blog/rich-tehrani/security/ter-
rorist-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-a-social-networker.html; see also Adam Gabbatt, Web
Postings of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, GUARDIAN UK (Dec. 29, 2009, 11:52 AM), http:/
/www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/29/web-postings-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab
(providing examples of Abdulmutallab’s postings).
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There must be thousands (if not more) cases where persons exhibit
troubling behaviors, which are unconnected to terrorist tendencies.
Verifying the information provided will increase the time and expense
required to process visas, but without verification the process seems
pro forma.  It would be difficult to sort out the truly useful informa-
tion from the sea of not-so-useful information.  How is the U.S. gov-
ernment going to sort through this potential flood of information?
I have resisted the inclination to identify which particular catego-
ries of elites the proposal would apply to.  This question is best left to
technical experts with national security expertise.  Even without the
benefit of inside information, some mechanisms of classifying elites to
reduce information overload are immediately apparent.177  For exam-
ple, elite terrorists appear to be disproportionately likely to have sci-
ence and engineering backgrounds.  Similarly, elite terrorists seem to
be disproportionately likely to come from particular regions of the
world.  The authorities might impose the obligation to snitch only on
elites from those regions, in the interest of mitigating the problems of
information overload.  However, this would feed into a perception
that the obligation falls disproportionately on Muslims or those of
Middle Eastern origin.  In the interest of not alienating precisely those
elites where cooperation is most needed, DHS might resist the ten-
dency to categorize publicly, imposing the obligation on a much
broader category of elites, even if they later focus on information pro-
vided by elites of particular nationalities.
III. WHY DID THE ELDER MUTALLAB SNITCH?
A. Background
A more detailed consideration of the elder Mutallab’s network is
instructive.  Umarmutallab was a former Nigerian Cabinet Minister178
and Chairman of one of Nigeria’s largest banks.179  He was a member
of the Board of Directors of several publicly traded Nigerian firms.180
177 For example, in the Honduran context the persons who lost their visas were
recipients of B-1 business visas, which enabled ease of targeting.  The B-1 visa applies
to noncitizens who are visiting the United States temporarily for business. See 8 U.S.C
§ 1101(A)(15)(B) (2006); 22 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (2006).
178 A summary of his biography is included in the leading weekly newspaper of the
Hausa tribe in Nigeria. See Idris Ahmed, Mutallab, An Accomplished Banker, SUNDAY
TRUST (Dec.27, 2009, 12:28 AM), http://sundaytrust.com.ng/?option=com_content&
view=article&id=2390:mutallab-an-accomplished-banker&catid=41:latest-news&Itemid
=26.
179 See id.
180 See id.
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He was also particularly prominent in the Muslim community as the
primary patron of a well-known mosque.181
Umarmutallab is described as someone “whose friends cut across
states, religion and sex.”182  In the words of a Nigerian commentator:
[T]he older Mutallab benefitted from his deft positioning across an
immense network of family, geo-ethnic and professional layers of
interests.  Consequently, the man has had a near permanent pres-
ence on Nigeria’s economic landscape as government official, bank-
ing investor, facilitator or shareholder—working the levers of
power—all through civilian and military governments in Nigeria for
more than 35 years.183
B. Rational Motives
With the benefit of hindsight, Umarmutallab’s behavior appears
to have been well thought out and highly planned.  Irrespective of
whether his larger strategic goals might have been to save his son’s
life, maintain his mobility, protect his financial assets, or preserve his
familial honor, tactically, he took several steps to achieve his broader
goals.
First, he utilized his private networks to signal disapproval of his
son’s behavior.  For example, the elder Mutallab withdrew financial
support from his son.184  He did not hide this information; he shared
his decision with family and close associates.185  In so doing, he made
clear to his private networks that he disapproved of Abdulmutallab’s
decision to relocate to Yemen while implicitly communicating that
anyone else who offered support would incur his disapproval.
But notably, the elder Mutallab moved beyond these quintessen-
tially private actions taken in private networks.  Importantly, he took
the much larger step of signifying his disapproval to the public author-
ities by snitching.  He met with the Nigerian security officials at the
highest levels.186  He sought their assistance in curtailing his son’s
travel overseas and arranging his return to Nigeria.187
181 See id.
182 Chido Nwangwu, The Mutallabs: Terror-bound Son Farouk and Business Mogul
Father Umar, USAAFRICAONLINE, (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.usafricaonline.com/
mutallabs-chido-usafrica/; see also Walker et al., supra note 105 (discussing the wealth R
of Umarmutallab); Rice, supra note 108 (noting that his father’s affluence upset R
Abdulmutallab).
183 Nwangwu, supra note 182. R
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id.
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Third, through Nigerian security officials, Umarmutallab
arranged meetings with their American counterparts.  He met with
Embassy officials repeatedly, providing evidence of his son’s increas-
ing radicalism including details of his travel to Yemen.188  He
expressed particular concern that his son indicated in a telephone call
that he did not expect to see his family again.189 Furthermore, the
elder Mutallab reportedly met with a senior officer at the CIA.190
Through all these efforts, Umarmutallab indicated very clearly whose
side he was on.  Not only was he not providing support to a terrorist
network, he also underlined that he was willing to help disrupt it.
Why did Umarmutallab snitch?  Although commentators empha-
sized the heart-wrenching nature of the father’s decision to report his
child to the authorities, the emotional nature of the decision does not
preclude strategic behavior.  Speculation as to the father’s motives in
subsequent analyses has been rife.  Motives are notoriously difficult to
ascertain.  Indeed, two millennia after Judas Iscariot snitched to the
Chief Priests,191 we are still speculating about what made him do it!
Yet in this instance ascertaining potential motives may be fruitful to
the extent that it helps us to provide incentives for similar behavior in
the future.
Some may have a rather cynical view of Umarmutallab’s actions.
As a very wealthy man with assets in many countries, he could hardly
afford for these assets to be frozen simply because of the wayward
actions of his son.  As one relative noted, “[t]his is somebody who has
investments in the Western world since before the boy was born . . .
[h]e’s got a £4 million house in London.  Now the boy is jeopardizing
everything.”192  Moreover, he was necessarily dependent on global
mobility to conduct his business.  Snitching may have been a pre-emp-
tive mechanism of protecting his mobility and his assets.
On this view, one could posit what might be broadly character-
ized as rational choice or welfarist accounts of Umarmutallab’s behav-
ior.  Simply put, on this account, Umarmutallab is a rational utility
maximizer who has decided that he is most likely to maximize his wel-
fare by snitching on his son.  That is, when faced with the prospect of
visa revocation and the potential freezing of his assets if the authori-
ties suspected that he had provided financial support for his son’s
attempted terrorist attack, he decided that he was simply better off
188 See Nossiter, supra note 32, at A10. R
189 See id. at A1.
190 See Nwangwu, supra note 182. R
191 See Matthew 27:3–8.
192 Nossiter, supra note 32, at A10. R
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reporting his son.  (It is precisely such a view that is reflected in the
quotation from a relative in the preceding paragraph.)
The larger point is that it is helpful to view his behavior through a
game theoretic lens.  That is, like the aforementioned Honduran busi-
nesspersons, as a wealthy international banker, the elder Mutallab
may be conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat-game arrange-
ments with overseas actors.  For example, if Umarmutallab engages in
transnational banking transactions, with intermediary U.S.-based
banks, these repeat-game arrangements are necessarily contingent on
the cooperation of the U.S. government.  Indeed, Umarmutallab may
be quite reasonably conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat
game arrangements with the U.S. government itself.  The future con-
sequences of noncooperative behavior may give him good reason to
pre-emptively snitch.
There is a broader point here.  Can the United States expect net-
work members to reliably meet their informational sharing function?
Utilizing game theoretic analogies, this Article contends that the
answer will generally be yes.  In a competitive globalized context in
which elites value the access that they have to the United States, the
repeated nature of their interactions with the United States increases
the likelihood that they will share information.
Yet, this recommendation is not dependent on whether elites
“generally” snitch rather than risk withdrawal of their visa privileges.
Using the previous game-theoretic analyses, if a player does not per-
ceive that she will suffer in the long term from noncooperative behav-
ior with the United States, she may well defect early in the “game.”
Perhaps her U.S. visa is not particularly valuable, particularly if she
does not believe that U.S. visa revocation will trigger other Western
countries to revoke her other visas.193 Thus, if a potential snitch has
other valuable visas (such as visas to Canada or the European Union)
which provide her Western market access, and she does not perceive
these visas to be at risk, she may be willing to put her U.S. visa at risk.
Moreover, there are many reasons that she might hesitate to
snitch.  She might feel there is not really enough evidence to justify
her suspicions.  Moreover, she might fear that the United States itself
will act uncooperatively by failing to keep her cooperation confiden-
tial.  In so doing, the United States would undermine her status in the
193 That is, a potential snitch may not believe that Western governments would act
cooperatively and collectively revoke her visas.  Indeed, this would not be an unrea-
sonable perception since even after the British immigration authorities denied
Abdulmutallab’s visa application, other countries including the United States did not
revoke his visa.
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group or even provoke her expulsion from the group.  She might also
have concerns about the personal safety of family members in her
home country who are not able to travel and as such may be quintes-
sential “hostages.”194  Furthermore, even if the consequences are not
so extreme, she might be concerned that community members will
question her motives.  Rather than being perceived as honorable, she
might be branded as a U.S. lackey.  Moreover, she might remain silent
out of a belief that the U.S. government is very unlikely to discover
that she had this information.  Thus the case does not rest on an
acceptance of the prediction that elites will “generally” snitch.  It
should be enough to posit that elites will snitch in some significant
number of cases.  Whatever that number is, the benefit of this propo-
sal to the U.S. national interest is considerable, given the terrible
potential toll of even a single terrorist act.
C. Norms-based Motives
Word is, on the streets in Nigeria and abroad, that the name ‘Mutal-
lab’ is now a bonafide word in the English dictionary!  As a noun, it
means ‘someone who brings shame to his family, to others or to his
country.’195
Traditional deterrence theory posits a relationship between the
perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions and the likelihood
that a rational individual will abide by a rule.  Conceptualizing man as
a rational calculator of potential costs and rewards from potential acts,
legal sanctions are viewed as a cost that would accompany a potential
illegal act.  Given this view of the “rational man,” we should mandate
information sharing and enforce tough penalties to motivate network
members who suspect terrorist activities to share information.  Yet,
there is an alternative view.  In norm-driven cultures, shame is a pri-
mary mechanism of social control and may be utilized to motivate per-
sons to share critical information with the government.  Indeed, a less
traditional view of effective deterrents (namely successful disincentives
to anti-social behavior) is based primarily on this view of social
control.
For example, the sociologist Dennis Wrong decried the dispro-
portionate focus on formal sanctions in traditional theories of deter-
194 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (arguing that hostages are used for economic
purposes).
195 From a popular Nigerian diaspora blogger, “Tochi.”  Tochi, In Spite of Mutallab
I Am Still Here, AND TOCHI SAYS . . . WHOSE THOUGHTS ARE YOU THINKING (Jan. 11,
2010), http://www.tochi.us/blog/?p=1572.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 44 20-APR-12 11:00
1016 notre dame law review [vol. 87:3
rence and contended that informal sanctions in the form of social
disapproval were potentially as effective deterrents, since man is
“essentially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self
by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others.”196  Since
Wrong’s landmark paper, considerable empirical evidence has
emerged from the behavioral sciences to support the notion that the
withdrawal of esteem is an effective mechanism of sanctioning.197
Wrong’s supplement to traditional deterrence theory proves rele-
vant to theories of normative deterrence such as the one posited here.
Of course, communal norms do not always reinforce U.S. law enforce-
ment goals.  For example, some communities appear to celebrate sui-
cide bombing as a legitimate means of political statement.198  It would
be difficult to stimulate community members to withdraw esteem as
an effective method of sanctioning if the very behavior that the
United States is seeking to deter is instead celebrated.199
However, this is unlikely to be true of elite communities, which
the sociological literature tells us generally share an inclination to
avoid unwelcome attention.200  Indeed, although official sanctioning
might play some role in the individual decision-making matrices of
Umarmutallab, a potentially more relevant factor is that his elite com-
munity perceives terrorist violations to be unattractive because they
draw unwanted attention to the community.  Under a social deter-
rence framework, Umarmutallab’s action may be viewed against the
background of such an elite culture, which prioritizes shame avoid-
ance and honor restoration.201
196 Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, 26
AM. SOC. REV. 183, 185 (1961).
197 For a summary of such studies, see Donna M. Bishop, Legal and Extralegal Barri-
ers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 403 (1984).  For a summary of
more recent work, see Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2
LAW & POL’Y Q. 61, 69 (1980).
198 See Adam L. Silverman, Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western
and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence, 44 J. CHURCH & STATE 73 (2002).
199 See id.
200 See generally BOTTOMORE, supra note 13. R
201 Indeed, precisely this point is captured in two classic works of literature from
Nigeria which share similar themes: the Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s Death and the
King’s Horsemen and the Nobel nominee Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart.  Death and
the King’s Horsemen is inspired by a famous incident in Nigerian colonial history. See
Bernth Lindfors, A Last Shot at the 20th-Century Canon, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AFRICAN
LITERATURE 109 (Ernest N. Emenyonu ed., 2006) (noting that in both Soyinka and
Achebe’s texts, the protagonists go to great lengths to extirpate shame and restore
family honor, even by committing ritual suicide).
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Given this background context, it is perhaps unsurprising that in
the Nigerian blogosphere, the younger Mutallab’s actions were widely
perceived as bringing shame not only to the family, but also to the
nation.  One blogger on a popular Nigerian diaspora blog decried the
failure of Nigerian elites to defend their country’s name publicly in
the face of the Obama administration’s decision to put Nigeria on a
“high risk” terror list,202 declaring, “the Mutallab effect seems to be
shutting us all up.  The shame is collectively shared.  The collateral
damage is resulting in embarrassment and self-doubt.”203  As if to
extirpate such shame, a headline in a major Nigerian newspaper
appropriated the words of a Nigerian Minister to capture the senti-
ments of the entire country: “He is not one of us.”204
A noble view of the older Mutallab’s motives highlights the poten-
tial disgrace to the family name that would, and did, result from his
son’s actions.  In anticipation of the monumental blow to the family’s
honor, the father’s decision to snitch might be viewed as a pre-emp-
tive attempt to restore honor.  While the son has sullied the family
and the nation, the elder Mutallab’s actions have been perceived as a
valiant attempt to restore the dignity of his family and the broader
Nigerian society.
It bears emphasizing that these constructs are not peculiar to
Nigeria, and, as such, the broader insight has larger applicability.
Shame has been a historical mechanism of sanctioning in a wide
range of cultures from the Hebrew nation, to indigenous tribal groups
on all five continents.205  Even biblical prophets were subject to shame
when they transgressed widely understood social rules.206  The Israe-
lite King David was shamed repeatedly for committing adultery in vio-
lation of biblical laws, despite his elevated status.  David’s narrative is
simply a biblical antecedent to that of the Mutallab family;207 many
202 Micheline Maynard & Liz Robbins, New Restrictions Quickly Added for Air Passen-
gers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/us/27secur-
ity.html.
203 See Reuben Abati, Mutallab: We Are Guilty by Association, NIGERIAN VILLAGE
SQUARE (Jan. 3, 2010, 05:01 AM), http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/reu-
ben-abati/mutallab-we-are-guilty-by-association.html.
204 Akunyulim, supra note 100. R
205 Two such classic texts are MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 20
(1968) and E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 232 (1954).
206 The following text in Jeremiah is understood to be a warning to prophets who
would transgress social rules: “The wise men are put to shame, They are dismayed and
caught; Behold, they have rejected the word of the Lord, And what kind of wisdom do
they have?” Jeremiah 8:9 (New American Standard).
207 The narrative of David’s transgression and punishment by God, including pub-
lic shaming, are contained in the Old Testament at 2 Samuel 11–12.
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societies have their own Davids.  Communal shame-based sanctioning
has a long heritage (and surely a longer heritage than law-based sanc-
tioning!).208  Although much has been made of the decline of shame
as an effective mechanism of sanctioning in modern society, in many
societies, shaming is still an effective mechanism of social control.209
D. What Are the Implications of a Norms-based Analysis?
Given this background recognition of a shame-based approach to
motivating compliance with legal rules, the U.S. government may be
better served by a soft, as opposed to a heavy-handed approach.
Hence, the focus on visa revocation.  The revocation of such a privi-
lege, which is typically done privately by the State Department (and as
such, is not a matter of the public record), is a quintessential “soft”
approach.
By articulating a duty to snitch and reinforcing extant communal
norms in a subtle as opposed to heavy-handed manner, the U.S. gov-
ernment will potentially reduce the likelihood that network members
will fence-sit.  The aim is for the government to motivate network
members to signal clearly which side of the fence they fall on.  In so
doing, they may even motivate network members to withdraw esteem
from any other network member who had reason to know valuable
information and failed to snitch.
A final point may be in order.  The emphasis on norms/commu-
nal based sanctioning derives in part from an appreciation of the clear
differences between the manner in which the state functions in less-
developed states such as Nigeria and the traditional understanding of
state function in the Anglo-American legal tradition.  In many devel-
oping countries, the state is not a reliable provider of public goods; it
is functionally irrelevant.210  Rather, the individual will rely on
208 McAdams makes this point forcefully. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350–75 (1997).  The point
is discussed in all of the following texts, which discuss individual shaming, particularly
as a mechanism of mitigating collective shame. See generally COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND COR-
PORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY (2000); LARRY MAY,
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992); LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS (1987); Joel
Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674 (1968).
209 McAdams has a good summary of the continued prevalence of shame-based
sanctioning systems.  McAdams, supra note 208.  Indeed, modern Chinese shopkeep- R
ers in New York regularly post the names and pictures of shoplifting suspects as a
deterrent to future shoplifters.  Corey Kilgannon & Jeffrey E. Singer, Shoplifting Sus-
pects’ Choice: Pay or Be Shamed, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A1.
210 This point is made particularly well in the literature in context of post-conflict
societies. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional
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extended tribal and familial ties for the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and even “public goods” (e.g. roads, public utilities etc.) will
often be provided through extended tribal and familial networks.  In
such a context, it becomes particularly important to leverage extant
tribal/communal based norms.  Thus, a duty to snitch may be per-
ceived as an attempt to “nudge” the elder Mutallab off the proverbial
fence to report behavior that is already in violation of communal-
based norms.211
IV. THE DANGERS
I now turn to discussing a few of the elephants in the room.  First,
there are concerns about the dangers of alienating subsections of soci-
ety that are critical to law enforcement efforts by placing affirmative
obligations upon them that are not perceived to apply more broadly
to other sections of the society.  Second, there is a concern regarding
the McCarthyite implications of imposing a duty to snitch.212  Third,
there is a concern regarding the dangers of corruption of the process
more generally.  Moreover, there may be major due process and equal
protection concerns among immigrants and Muslim Americans.213  If
Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213 (2008); Jamie O’Connell,
Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia,
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207 (2004); Paul
Richards, War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 41 (2001).
211 The utilization of the term “nudge” here is a play on the utilization of the term
in RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  The book draws on
research in psychology and behavioral economics to defend libertarian paternalism
and active engineering of choice architecture.
212 Although the policy proposal undoubtedly raises some of the concerns of this
earlier era, First Amendment challenges to perceived exclusion on the basis of certain
ideological commitments (or even more tenuously association with those bearing cer-
tain ideological commitments, since this proposal specifically targets “associates”) are
unlikely to be successful. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. R
213 Although this is undoubtedly a serious concern, it bears emphasizing that this
is not a primary topic of this Article.  Indeed, this has been dealt with ably elsewhere.
See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences
of Racial Profiling after September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002); see also, Susan M.
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002);
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1413 (2002); Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safe-
guarding the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 72–85 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575 (2002); Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is
Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1173 (2004). Several of the articles in
supra note 71 also discuss this concern. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 48 20-APR-12 11:00
1020 notre dame law review [vol. 87:3
these concerns are left unaddressed, Muslim American advocacy
groups have argued that such perceived targeting of communities will
undermine intelligence sharing.214
Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights move-
ment, Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirma-
tive duties (i.e. to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply
not to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society.215  Malcolm
X argued that the imposition of such obligations on blacks and black
Muslims in particular (even implicitly) threatened to alienate pre-
cisely those portions of the population whose cooperation is critical to
law enforcement efforts.216
The applicability of this critique to this proposal is obvious.
Indeed, among public intellectuals, there has been considerable dis-
quiet about the distinction between “moderate” and “other” Mus-
lims.217  There also appears to be an implicit obligation that seems to
attach to Muslims to display their moderate bona fides.218  To the
extent that this proposal is formulated specifically in response to Al
Qaeda’s penetration of Muslim elites, and might appear to dispropor-
tionately impact Muslim elites, critics might reasonably argue that
obligations are yet again, attaching to Muslims to prove their “modera-
tion” in a manner that is not expected of non-Muslims.  Such actions
potentially undermine faith in law enforcement.
Moreover, Natapoff has written convincingly of the dangers that
an excessive reliance on snitching will undermine faith in law enforce-
ment in the context of another community, namely poor African
American urban communities:
The policy [of disproportionate reliance on snitching] presupposes
a community filled with criminals that needs to be infiltrated in
order to be saved.  It is a community with reduced privacy interests
in which it is permissible for the state to use informants to penetrate
the most private zones in pursuit of prosecutorial goals.  It is, in
essence, a community with lessened dignitary interests in the eyes of
the state . . . [a community that] is treated as having relinquished
some of the basic rights to privacy and to be let alone.219
214 See supra notes 45–46 for references containing a discussion of these concerns. R
215 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
216 Id.
217 The debate between Daniel Larison and Ross Douhat on the New York Times
blog epitomizes the concern regarding this distinction. See Ross Douthat, More on
Rauf and Moderate Islam, EVOLUTIONS (Aug. 27, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://douthat.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/08/27/more-on-rauf-and-moderate-islam/.
218 See id.
219 Natapoff, supra note 39, at 695 (footnote omitted). R
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Some of these concerns are unavoidable.  Nevertheless, they can
be mitigated.  Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I have taken
pains to emphasize the “soft” nature of the sanctioning for non-com-
pliant persons.  Notably, the Department of Justice has been criticized
for what has been characterized as prosecutorial overreaching in rela-
tion to the communities of terrorist suspects.220  The concern is that
law enforcement targets community members even when they play no
role in attacks, for unrelated and relatively minor immigration trans-
gressions, thus undermining the likelihood that communities will
share intelligence with the authorities.221  Moreover, these communi-
ties are now transnational.222  If an immigrant is deported for a minor
immigration infraction, she will take the animosity she feels towards
the United States back to her community and country of origin,
thereby undermining the likelihood that her broader circle of family
and friends will cooperate with the United States.
This point is particularly relevant in light of the earlier point
about the distinction between the manner in which the state has tradi-
tionally been conceptualized in the Anglo-American legal tradition,
and the limited utility of the state in developing countries such as
Nigeria.  If developing countries are not well placed to be reliable
intelligence partners,223 it is especially important to keep the commu-
nities within these countries on the side of the United States.  Hence,
the necessity for a more flexible approach to sanctioning that allows
one to leverage these communal ties.
A. The Dangers of the Imposition of an Affirmative Duty More Generally
The critique is augmented by the proposal’s imposition of affirm-
ative duties as opposed to the traditional negative duties on elites.  In
220 See Ashar, supra note 213, at 1193 (“[T]he DOJ, working on less-than credible R
tips, has effectively disrupted individual lives, families, and communities.”).
221 See id.
222 The transnational nature of the alien population is a major theme in the socio-
logical literature, but the law review literature generally appears not to have incorpo-
rated this insight.  For a summary of the transnationalism research, see Peggy Levitt,
Salsa and Ketchup:  Transnational Migrants Straddle Two Worlds, in THE CONTEXTS
READER 445 (Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper eds., 2008).  The sociology literature
generally refers to transnational persons as migrants who maintain strong connec-
tions to their countries of origin.  The only person who seems to have incorporated
this insight in the legal scholarship is Kim Barry. See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The
Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006).
223 This may be the case even if the state is well intentioned; its unreliability may
simply be due to its limited reach.  Indeed, this point is made particularly well in a
New York Times article on Nigeria’s intelligence failures. See Adam Nossiter, Security
Flaws in Nigeria Are Now Drawing Notice, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A10.
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the traditional liberal philosophical conception of moral personhood,
all persons are moral agents who have varying moral duties.  Yet not
all duties are created equal.  That is, there is a moral and conceptual
distinction between affirmative and negative duties.224
Negative duties restrict actions; they set limits of behaviors that
we may not pursue without infringing on the rights of others.225  Neg-
ative duties follow from liberalism’s prioritization of individual auton-
omy and rights.  On a traditional conception of negative moral duties,
it would be understandable if visa recipients have a duty not to harm.
This proposal however, goes further.  Not only do visa recipients have
a duty not to harm, they have a duty to share such information to
prevent such harm, to the extent that information, which may prevent
terrorist threats is accessible to them.  They have an affirmative duty to
take action.  Such a duty is bound to be more controversial, because it
arises from an affirmative conception of human obligation.  Although
positive duties are more likely understood to hold generally (that is,
we have a general duty to help others), how we fulfill that duty is typi-
cally left up to us.226  In this proposal, an obligation is imposed on the
individual to help the authorities.  The individual appears to have lit-
tle say in the matter.
The imposition of affirmative duties is a logical extension of an
emerging consensus (certainly post 9/11) that we have affirmative
obligations to prevent terrorist attacks.  We are all familiar with the
injunctions in airports and train stations to report strange behaviors,
strange bags etc.  Typically, for American nationals, there are rarely
legal consequences for a failure to report suspicious activity.
However, the same cannot be said for noncitizens.  For example,
at least one friend of the would-be Times Square bomber, Shahzad
was deported for a minor visa infraction although he was never
charged and no evidence was presented publicly that he had specific
knowledge of Shahzad’s nefarious activities.227  The reason for the
deportation was clear.  The FBI was clearly sending a message to the
224 An accessible summary of the difference between the two types of duties is H.
M. Malm, Directions of Justification in the Negative-Positive Duty Debate, 27 AM. PHIL. Q.
315 (1990).
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 Shelly Murphy, Pakistani Testified Before Grand Jury, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5,
2010, at B10, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/arti-
cles/2010/06/05/man_arrested_in_ny_terror_plot_testified_before_grand_jury/.
Minor violations would not as a matter of practice result in deportation even in what
scholars have characterized as a hostile “crimmigration” climate. See, e.g., Chaco´n,
supra note 71 (discussing the “criminalization of migration in the United States”). R
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community of Pakistanis.  If you suspect something, speak up.  Other-
wise, your own visa privileges may later be at risk.  Yet while it was clear
that the authorities were sending a message, the FBI refused to con-
firm reporters’ suspicions.  But why the subterfuge?228  If as a de facto
(if not de jure) matter, certain aliens are subject to visa revocation for
failing to report behavior that the authorities believe that they had
reason to know, shouldn’t DHS be forthright about precisely what
their reporting obligations are?
B. The Dangers of Corruption in Social Networks
In most visa-allocation programs, typically, the number of quali-
fied applicants will exceed the number of visa slots.  Therefore, the
potential rent-seeking problems are apparent.  In this particular pro-
posal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented.  How so?
Projects that are reliant on leveraging social networks are particularly
prone to corruption because they are necessarily reliant on friend-
ships and familial relationships.229  This project suffers from the same
deficiency that characterizes projects that are similarly reliant on
social networks.
What is the implication of this insight for this proposal?  One
could imagine that members of one tribal group may receive prefer-
ences not available to members of another tribal group.  The implica-
tion of this is that certain elites may be inclined to receive the benefit
of the doubt with respect to potentially suspicious behavior in relation
to other elites.  Thus, repeated travel to Yemen may be perceived as
problematic for members of one elite group but not for members of
another elite group.
228 The term “subterfuge” in legal scholarship has been popularized by Guido Cal-
abresi.  Policy makers often employ “subterfuges,” that is, fictions to shield the tragic
nature of their choices that offend deeply held values from public view. GUIDO CALA-
BRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 88 (1985).
229 As one commentator has said:
[T]here is an important cultural component to corruption.  Many corrupt
officials do not seek to transgress social rules; rather, the rules of their soci-
ety demand that they help family and friends before they see to the general
public interest.  In many ways, nepotism is one of the most natural of human
impulses.
Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda, in SOCIAL CAPI-
TAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 35, 45 (Rau´l Atria
et al. comps., 2004).
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C. McCarthyite Tendencies: Undermining Social Trust
There is also the question of whether the spirit (if not the letter)
of the First Amendment is being breached.230  Decisions during the
Cold War era to exclude aliens for their associations with suspected
American communists (and implicitly for their unwillingness to
“snitch” on these communists) have withstood judicial scrutiny; it
seems clear that we may set aside constitutional concerns.231  How-
ever, even if we are able to get around the constitutional questions,
aspects of the proposal rightly offend our deepest moral intuitions.
Indeed, the reliance on a culture of snitching that is reminiscent
of the McCarthy era, in and of itself raises serious concerns.  For
example, detailed ethnographic studies of the impact of an informant
culture in East Germany illuminate the dangers of an over-reliance on
snitches to the social fabric of the broader society.232
With husbands snitching on wives and neighbors snitching on
neighbors, a widespread atmosphere of distrust developed in the
broader society.  Indeed, one author described the “indirect harm” of
a widespread societal “malaise” or societal “schizophrenia.”233  In the
words of one East German intellectual, “[t]hese informers determined
my life . . . [i]n one way or another—because they poisoned us with
mistrust.”234
A similar culture of suspicion is said to pervade the Palestinian
territories, partly because of the widespread suspicion that Israel is
230 Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it clear that any First Amendment chal-
lenges to immigration restrictions are likely to fail, even when the First Amendment
interests of American citizens are at stake.  This jurisprudence is summarized in Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).  Although American citizens have the right to
associate with and receive information and ideas from aliens whom the government
desires to exclude, this right will generally not outweigh “Congress’ ‘plenary power to
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those charac-
teristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766 (quoting Bouti-
lier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)); see also Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573
F.3d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 2009); Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir.
2008); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2002); Price v. INS,
41 F.2d 878, 842 (9th Cir. 1991).
231 Notably the duty will apply only to foreign nationals on foreign soil who would
typically have difficulty pressing First Amendment claims.  Indeed as the cases in the
previous footnote illustrate, even American citizens who seek to associate with or ben-
efit from the ideas of such excluded foreign nationals have had difficulty pressing
First Amendment claims.
232 The most comprehensive work in this regard is Barbara Miller’s.  BARBARA
MILLER, NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE IN UNIFIED GERMANY (1999).
233 Id. at 133.
234 Id. at 101.
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highly reliant on Palestinian informants.235  Palestinians who are per-
ceived to be beneficiaries of elite privileges (such as access to travel
permits) are often the targets of suspicion.236  Similar stories also
emerge from Northern Ireland, again because of the perceived reli-
ance of the authorities on informants.237
Of course, the diffuse utilization of snitches in diverse elite net-
works on different continents is not equivalent to the concentrated
efforts of the East German secret police.  Yet, one need not go so far
to recognize the dangers to the communities from which the snitches
originate.  The effect that the McCarthy era had in cultivating a cul-
ture of suspicion in targeted communities (such as the artistic and
academic communities) provides plentiful examples.238  Thus, if visa
revocations are too widely utilized, those who retain their visas will
necessarily become the targets of suspicion in their communities (not
unlike the aforementioned Palestinians).
Moreover, the dangers of reliance on informant institutions are
exacerbated because we often cannot know the motives of the persons
who are snitching.  In addition to the previously discussed corruption
problem, there are also dangers of elite capture.239  Given the highly
competitive nature of some elite networks, consider the following
example.  One could imagine that an elite entrepreneur might share
inaccurate information about a competitor in a deliberate effort to
discredit her and even have her removed from the United States.
Although generally we hope that the persons who come forward
to share information will be “good” types who have sincere concerns
regarding a peer who may be a terrorist threat, there may be either
“bad” types or “mixed” types who proffer information.  These would
include individuals who purposefully utilize this process to tarnish the
reputation of someone who is not a terrorist threat.  They could also
use the process to curry favor with the authorities for their own pur-
235 See Lee Hockstader, Palestinians Battle the Enemy Within: Menace of Israeli Collabo-
rators Spawns Executions, Vigilantism, Revenge Killings, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at A18.
236 See id.
237 See Editorial, Haunted By an Informer, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 2003.
238 A comprehensive text documenting the effect of the McCarthy era on cultural
communities, particularly Hollywood, is VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980).
The playwright, Arthur Miller recognized this risk decades ago.  On risks of snitching,
see John Lahr’s review of Arthur Miller’s seminal play, A View from the Bridge.  John
Lahr, Devil in the Flesh: Arthur Miller and Noe¨l Corwald on Acting Out, NEW YORKER, Feb.
1, 2010, at 78.
239 A good summary of the challenges of elite capture is included in Pranab
Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 135 (2000) and Jean-Philippe Platteau, Monitoring Elite Capture in Com-
munity-Driven Development, 35 DEV. & CHANGE 223 (2004).
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poses, including motivating the authorities to forgive their own crimi-
nal behavior.240
However, these concerns can be mitigated if it is made clear that
information will not be taken at face value, but rather will be subject
to rigorous verification.  The best deterrent to such behavior is to
make clear that individuals may compromise their visa privileges if it
later turns out that they knowingly shared false information for nefari-
ous motives.  The goal is to provide incentives for persons to share
information that they reasonably believe to be troubling, while provid-
ing disincentives for them to share information that they have good
reason to believe is false.
CONCLUSION
  In contexts beyond Nigeria, the United States may strategically
deploy both the revocation of privilege and this cultural valuation of
family honor as a mechanism for motivating persons to share impor-
tant information.  By articulating a duty to snitch, which reinforces
communal norms, the United States can nudge the Umarmutallabs of
the world in the right direction.
Importantly, the “nudge” should be sufficiently soft so as to be
constructive.  Moreover, if communal norms are already working in
the United States’ favor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa revoca-
tion may be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.
240 “Mixed” types include individuals who may not harbor ill will towards other
elites who have visas.  Nevertheless, they share information for motives other than a
general affirmative duty to prevent harm, without taking reasonable efforts to verify
such information even if they have reason to believe that such information may not be
accurate.
